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I. INTRODUCTION
The November 5, 1974, general election resulted in adoption of
a number of constitutional amendments.
Article I, section 2, the guarantee of equal protection, now con-
cludes with the statement: "No person shall be deprived of any right
because of race, religion or physical handicap." (The italicized
words were added by the 1974 amendment.)
Article IV, section 9 provides that the five members of the
Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission shall be "appointed by the
govenor subject to confirmation by the senate .... " The section
further provides:
The commission shall exercise the regulatory and executive
[rather than non-judicial] powers of the state with respect to
wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life . . . . The legislature
may enact laws in aid of the commission, not inconsistent with
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this section. The commission's exercise of executive powers in the
area of planning, budgeting, personnel management, and pur-
chasing shall be provided by law. Revenue derived from such
license fees [for taking wild animal life and fresh water aquatic
life] shall be appropriated to the commission by the legislature
for the purpose of management, protection and conservation of
wild animal life and fresh water aquatic life.
Article V, section 12(a) clarifies and increases the powers of the
Judicial Qualifications Commission, which is now
vested with jurisdiction to investigate and recommend to the
Supreme Court of Florida the removal from office of any justice
or judge whose conduct, during term of office or otherwise occur-
ring on or after November 1, 1966, (without regard to the effective
date of this section) demonstrates a present unfitness to hold
office, and to investigate and recommend the reprimand of a
justice or judge whose conduct, during term of office or otherwise
occurring on or after November 1, 1966 (without regard to the
effective date of this section), warrants such a reprimand.
Section 12(c) of article V now specifies that members of the
commission, other than those subject to impeachment because of
other offices they hold concurrently, "shall be subject to removal
from the commission pursuant to the provisions of Article IV, Sec-
tion 7," which provides generally for the removal of officers other
than those subject to impeachment.
Pursuant to article V, section 12(d), "[t]he commission
[rather than the Supreme Court] shall adopt rules regulating its
proceedings . . ." subject to repeal "by general law enacted by a
majority vote of the membership of each house of the legislature, or
by the supreme court, five justices concurring." In addition to its
power to recommend removal or reprimand of a justice or judge,
[tihe commission may with seven members concurring recom-
mend to the supreme court the temporary suspension of any jus-
tice or judge against whom formal charges are pending and in the
event the supreme court suspends such justice or judge all pro-
ceedings before the commission and all hearings shall be public.
Otherwise, all proceedings before the commission shall be confi-
dential until a recommendation is filed with the clerk of the
supreme court recommending removal or public reprimand at
which time such proceedings shall become public record.
Furthermore, under section 12(e) of article V,
19761
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ft/he commission shall have access to all information from all
executive, legislative and judicial agencies, subject to the rules of
the commission. On request of the speaker of the house of repre-
sentatives or the governor, the commission shall make available
information for use in consideration of impeachment or suspen-
sion, respectively.
Article VII, section 10, dealing with pledges of credit, now has
a new subsection (d), permitting laws authorizing
a municipality, county, special district, or agency of any of them,
being a joint owner of, giving, or lending or using its taxing power
or credit for the joint ownership, construction and operation of
electrical energy generating or transmission facilities with any
corporation, association, partnership or person.
Article VIII, section 1(d), which pertains to elected county offi-
cials, gives the title "property appraiser" to the elected county offi-
cial who was previously described as tax assessor.
The previous survey in this Review' ended with cases contained
in volume 294, Southern Reporter Second Series, decided in the
spring of 1974. The present survey starts at that point, and ends
with cases in volume 308, decided in the spring of 1975. This survey
continues to make no attempt to cover criminal law and procedure,
since these topics are dealt with in another survey article.2
II. ORGANS OF STATE GOVERNMENT
A. Separation of Powers
1. PROHIBITION AGAINST ENCROACHMENT
In an advisory opinion,3 the supreme court reaffirmed its view
that the power of pardon and restoration of civil rights is vested
exclusively in the executive. The Governor had requested advice
concerning the Florida Correctional Reform Act of 1974.1 Section 28
of the Act' provided that upon conviction of a felony, a person would
suffer suspension of only certain civil rights, specifically the rights
to vote, to hold public office and to serve on a jury. The section also
1. Levinson, Florida Constitutional Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 551 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as 1974 Survey].
2. Marx & Tatum, Florida Criminal Law, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. - (1976).
3. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 306 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1975).
4. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-112.
5. Codified as FLA. STAT. § 944.292 (Supp. 1974).
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provided for the automatic reinstatement of these rights upon dis-
charge from parole or release from the custody of the department
of health and rehabilitative services without parole. The court found
section 28 to be "a clear infringement upon the constitutional
power of the Governor to restore civil rights."'
In interpreting two statutes dealing with bail, the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, was guided by the principle that
the power to admit to bail, being a judicial power, must be free from
encroachment by the legislative branch. Florida Statutes section
903.132 (1973) directed that "[n]o person may be admitted to bail
upon appeal from a conviction of a felony if such person has pre-
viously been convicted of a felony . . . ." Florida Statutes section
924.071(2) (1973) directed that a defendant whose case was stayed
pending the determination of an appeal made by the state from a
pretrial order "shall be released on his own recognizance . . . if he
is charged with a bailable offense." In Barnber v. State' and State
ex rel. Harrington v. Genung,8 the court held that these sections
could not be given mandatory effect, since to do so would permit a
legislative encroachment upon a judicial power.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, found an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the legislative field when the Circuit Court of
Dade County created a committee to assist the court in studying
that county's rush hour traffic program. Having determined that
the program was a proper exercise of the county's police power, the
district court in Dade County v. Palladeno9 held that the circuit
court was foreclosed from undertaking any further scrutiny of the
program.
2. PROHIBITION AGAINST DELEGATION
In State v. Holden,'" the discretion given to police officers to
make arrests under Florida's disorderly intoxication statute" was
upheld as constitutional by the supreme court. Because the statute
limited the discretion to situations where an intoxicated person
"endanger[ed] the safety of another person or property" or
6. 306 So. 2d at 521.
7. 300 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
8. 300 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
9. 303 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
10. 299 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1974).
11. FLA. STAT. § 856.011 (1973).
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"caus[ed] a public disturbance," it was held to be a valid attempt
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public and, there-
fore, a constitutional delegation of legislative power.
Despite a city ordinance's valid goal of insuring public safety,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Early Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. City of Port Orange," held that the ordinance empowering
building inspectors to determine whether mobile homes were pro-
perly set up was an invalid delegation of legislative power since it
lacked any definitive standards upon which the inspector's determi-
nation was to be made.
An Attorney General opinion'" during the survey period dealt
with statutes conferring power upon the Board of Regents to adopt
traffic regulations for institutions under its management, I4 to charge
off uncollectible accounts' and to authorize certain new construc-
tion." The opinion deemed these powers to partake so much of the
exercise of sovereign power that they could not be delegated to one
not commissioned as an "officer," as required by article II, section
5. Thus, according to the Attorney General, even though the Board
of Regents has the general power to delegate its duties to its chancel-
lor or to the presidents of the state universities, the particular duties
in question should not be delegated until legislative or judicial clari-
fication of the situation is received.
Sarasota County v. Barg"1 involved a special act 8 creating the
Manasota Key Conservation District within Sarasota County, and
prohibiting "undue or unreasonable dredging, filling or disturbance
of submerged bottoms," and "unreasonable destruction of natural
vegetation." Disputes arising under the act were to be settled by a
board of appeals, appointed by the County Commission. Decisions
of the board of appeals were to be enjoined or enforced by civil
litigation. The supreme court sustained most of the statute, but
severed and invalidated the portions quoted above. The court
stated:
The Act does not contain any standards or guidelines to aid any
court or administrative body in interpreting these terms. The
12. 299 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
13. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-208 (July 19, 1974).
14. FLA. STAT. § 239.54 (1973).
15. FLA. STAT. § 240.103(2) (1973).
16. FLA. STAT. § 240.141 (1973).
17. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
18. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-904.
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determination of what conduct falls within the proscription of
these ambiguous provisions is left to the unbridled discretion of
those responsible for applying and enforcing the Act. This
amounts to an unrestricted delegation of legislative authority, in
violation of the Florida Constitution, Article II, Section 3.11
B. Courts
1. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
a. Conflict Certiorari
In Adams v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.,2 certiorari ju-
risdiction was based on a conflict between the decision of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, in that case and a prior decision
of the same court in another case. The supreme court found conflict
since the district court, applying the same rule of law, had reached
different results in the two cases although the controlling facts were
substantially the same.
In Town of Lantana v. Pelczynski,2 ' certiorari was sought on the
basis of conflict between a district court decision and an earlier
supreme court decision. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, had followed a supervening decision"2 of the United States
Supreme Court and had expressly rejected the Supreme Court of
Florida precedent. Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court of
Florida receded from its own precedent and affirmed the district
court of appeal, yielding to the authority of the United States Su-
preme Court decision. However, in Wackenhut Corp. v. Judges of
the District Court of Appeal, Third District of Florida,3 the court
stated that a petition for certiorari will not be granted on the ground
of conflict between decisions in two districts, where the decision of
one of the district courts of appeal has been reversed by the Su-
preme Court of Florida.
b. Commissions Established by Law
The supreme court emphasized the discretionary nature of its
power to issue writs of certiorari to "commissions established by
19. 302 So. 2d at 742.
20. 296 So. 2d I (Fla. 1974).
21. 303 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1974).
22. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
23. 297 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1974).
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general law having statewide jurisdiction"" in Scholastic Systems,
Inc. v. LeLoup. ' In a reconsideration of how best to use its judicial
resources to give proper consideration to all cases which equally
demand its careful review, the court concluded that "there is no
constitutional requirement for the extensive, appellate-type review
previously afforded here in workmen's compensation cases."2
Henceforth the court's consideration of decisions of the Industrial
Relations Commission will be governed by the traditional standard
of "departure from the essential requirements of law." 7
c. Habeas Corpus
In Walker v. Wainwright,"5 a prisoner who was serving a num-
ber of concurrent and consecutive sentences petitioned the supreme
court for habeas corpus, alleging that one of the sentences resulted
from a coerced plea of guilty and from the trial judge's consideration
of improper factors in determining the sentence. The petitioner had
attempted to appeal, but had negligently failed to file notice of
appeal within the 30-day jurisdictional time period and the district
court of appeal had dismissed his appeal as untimely filed. The
supreme court noted that a writ of habeas corpus may issue even
though the petitioner is not entitled to immediate relief from con-
finement. Howevern the court dismissed the habeas petition, since
petitioner had failed to exhaust relief available under the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and had not demonstrated that the
state was responsible for his failure to do so.
d. Rules for Practice and Procedure and Administration of the
Judicial System
In Clement v. Aztec Sales, Inc.,'" the supreme court found that
an order granting a new trial is a substantive right within the do-
24. FLA. CONSr. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
25. 307 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974), noted in 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 798 (1975). A more critical
view is expressed in Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision anal
1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 617, 679 (1975).
26. 307 So. 2d at 168.
27. Id. This is also the standard applied in certiorari review of Public Service Commis-
sion orders, in interlocutory petitions and in common law certiorari.
28. Cases in which a writ of habeas corpus was used to obtain judicial review of parole
orders are discussed in section V, G infra.
29. 303 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974).
30. 297 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974).
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main of the legislature and not a matter of practice and procedure
within the rulemaking power of the supreme court." Therefore, the
court sustained the validity of a statute32 which provided an appeal
of an order granting a new trial. The court did not regard this as an
interlocutory appeal, and found no conflict between the statute
granting this appeal, and the Florida appellate rule33 which author-
izes interlocutory appeals only in certain situations, without men-
tion of orders granting new trials.
The court considered an alleged conflict between a statute34 and
a Rule of Juvenile Procedure," both dealing with the trial of juve-
niles as adults, in Davis v. State." After conducting a hearing, the
juvenile court had specifically found that there was probable cause
to believe that a 16-year-old child had committed certain felonies;
both the statute and the rule required such a finding as one of the
requisites for trial as an adult. The court had also found in accord-
ance with the second requirement of the rule that it was in the best
interest of the public that the juvenile court's jurisdiction over the
child be waived. The appellant contended that the juvenile court
had failed to meet the other requirements of the statute: that the
court must make a finding, based upon a consideration of certain
specified factors, that there is no reasonable prospect of rehabilitat-
ing the child prior to its majority; and that it set forth in writing
the reasons for its finding. The supreme court held that the factors
specified by the statute were intended to be guidelines for the deter-
mination of the public interest to the same extent that the eight
factors enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v.
United States37 were intended to be. The statutory provisions and
the Kent criteria were found not to apply in every case and to be
directory rather than mandatory.
Closely related to the rulemaking power of the supreme court
as a whole is the authority of the Chief Justice as chief administra-
tive officer of the judicial system. Under this authority, the Chief
31. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). While laws adopted by a two-thirds vote of both houses
may repeal the court's rules of practice and procedure, laws adopted by a lesser majority
which conflict with these rules are invalid.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 59.04 (1973).
33. FLA. App. R. 4.2(a).
34. FLA. STAT. § 39.09(2) (1973).
35. FLA. R. JUVENILE P. 8.110(b)(6)(c).
36. 297 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1974).
37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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Justice had ordered the visiting state attorney who was assigned to
the Leon County Grand Jury (in the Second Judicial Circuit) to
desist from proceeding with any further investigation of candidates
who had qualified for election until the day following the election.
The Governor had assigned the state attorney of the Fourth Judicial
Circuit to the Second Judicial Circuit for the maximum period
allowed by statute-60 days. The assignment had already been ex-
tended for 90 days upon the request of the Governor and the con-
currence of the supreme court. Upon the Governor's petitioning the
court for an additional extension, the Chief Justice entered the order
in controversy, whereupon the Attorney General, on behalf of the
Governor, asked the entire court to review the order. In In re
Executive Assignment of State Attorney," the court, by a four-to-
three margin, found the administrative order of the Chief Justice to
have been within the scope of his constitutional authority.
The Chief Justice in his order had noted that in some areas of
the state, and particularly in Leon County, grand juries were con-
ducting investigations of the conduct of certain incumbents and
other candidates for election. He further noted that although many
of these investigations could have been completed prior to the quali-
fying dates, they were instead being held so as to coincide with the
campaign season. These investigations and the resulting publicity
tended, according to the Chief Justice, to "confuse the electorate in
the careful weighing of the qualifications of the candidates in a calm
and objective manner."3 Thus, the grand jury, a part of the state
judicial system, was interfering with the right of the other two
branches of government to manage the election process.
Justice Overton in his dissenting opinion maintained that the
constitutional administrative authority over the judicial system
does not extend to consideration of how particular court proceedings
might affect candidates for election and does not include authority
to terminate grand jury investigations without a showing of illegal-
ity or improper conduct in a particular case. In upholding the order
as a proper exercise of the administrative authority of the Chief
Justice, the majority pointed out that prior to entering the order,
the Chief Justice had been assured by the state attorney that the
delay would not endanger the ultimate result of any matter under
38. 298 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1974).
39. Id. at 385.
[Vol. 30:277
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investigation. The majority also noted that the order had been re-
vised and clarified to the extent that the public interest and general
welfare of Florida and law enforcement generally would suffer no
injury. In particular, the stay order allowed any grand jury investi-
gation of a candidate to proceed upon showing of good cause. Under
this provision, presentment of the Leon County Grand Jury was
submitted to the Chief Justice, who found good cause therein to
rescind the prior orders. Thus, he allowed the investigations to pro-
ceed and he approved the request for the extension of the assign-
ment of the special prosecutor to the Leon County Grand Jury.
2. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court of Florida in Monroe Education Associa-
tion v. Clerk, District Court of Appeal, Third District,4" found that
under article V, section 4(b)(3), the district court is required to
accept and duly consider an application for a constitutional writ
even though it is not ancillary to any appellate matter pending in
that court. The questions of whether the writ should issue and
whether it would be more appropriate to transfer the application to
the circuit court, however, are left to the sound discretion of the
district court.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, ruled in
Galloway v. State4' that the circuit court, sitting in its appellate
capacity, should have treated an appeal from a decision of the
county court as a petition for writ of certiorari, the form of action
specified by statute in the circumstances, rather than deny review.
In support of its decision, the court cited article V, section 2(a) of
the Florida Constitution, under which the rules adopted by the
supreme court for all courts must include "a requirement that no
cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy had been
sought." Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in
Ison v. Florida Sanitarium & Benevolent Association2 treated an
appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari since the district courts of
appeal have no jurisdiction on appeal to review an appellate deci-
sion of a circuit court.
In State ex rel. Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc. v. Board of Business
40. 299 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974).
41. 305 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
42. 302 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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Regulation,': mandamus was found to be an appropriate action for
review of the Board's suspension of the petitioners' permits to oper-
ate jai-alai frontons and to conduct parimutuel wagering at the
frontons. The Board argued that review should be by certiorari
under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1961.1' However, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, held that certiorari would
lie only to review exercises of the "quasi-judicial" power of agencies,
while other remedies should be pursued to review "quasi-executive"
actions. The court characterized the agency's order in the present
case as being a mixture of quasi-judicial and quasi-executive, and
concluded that certiorari and mandamus were available as appro-
priate alternative remedies in the occasional instance where such
characterization applies. 5 The court observed that review of pre-
vious cases "leaves one hopelessly mired in procedural uncertainty
as to the proper remedy to be invoked." 4 Hopefully, the 1974 revi-
sion of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act has dispelled
much, if not quite all, of the uncertainty.
State ex rel. Rash v. Williams47 restated the principle that pro-
hibition is a prerogative writ by which a court having appellate
jurisdiction over an inferior court may prevent the latter from exer-
cising jurisdiction which has not been vested in it by law. Where the
question of the constitutionality of a statute does not go to the
fundamental jurisdiction of a court, a writ of prohibition to prevent
a judge from issuing an order under the statute is inappropriate. In
State ex rel. Christian v. Rudd,4" relator sought review of the circuit
court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him
on grounds that it had been improperly brought by the grand jury.
He petitioned for a writ of prohibition, or alternatively certiorari.
The court held common law certiorari to be the appropriate writ to
correct the procedure of a court which has not observed the require-
ments of law deemed essential to the administration of justice.
In the companion case, State ex rel. Christian v. Austin,"' the
43. 304 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
44. FLA. S'rAT. ch. 120 (1973).
45. The district court cited as authority for this conclusion West Flagler Associates, Ltd.
v. Board of Business Regulation, 241 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1970).
46. 304 So. 2d at 475.
47. 302 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
48. 302 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), modified on other grounds, 310 So. 2d 295 (Fla.
1975).
49. 302 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), modified on other grounds, 310 So. 2d 289 (Fla.
1975).
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District Court of Appeal, First District, held relator Christian to be
a proper party to bring a direct proceeding in quo warranto. Respon-
dent, the elected state attorney of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, had
been assigned by the Governor to serve in the Second Judicial Cir-
cuit in order to investigate certain allegations concerning the rela-
tor. The investigation led to five indictments against the relator.
Relator was challenging the propriety under the circumstances of
the respondent's discharging the duties of an elected official of the
Second Judicial Circuit. A writ of quo warranto is usually brought
by the Attorney General or by a state attorney but if these officials
will not institute the action, a private citizen may do so in certain
instances, and if the action is to enforce a public right by correcting
the usurpation, misuse or non-use of a public office, a relator need
not show a specific personal interest in the matter. It is enough that
the relator is a citizen and has an interest in having the law upheld;
no other real or personal interest need be shown.
3. DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
In State ex rel. Turner v. Earle,5" an incumbent circuit judge
sought a writ of prohibition from the supreme court in order to
prevent the Judicial Qualifications Commission from investigating
or proceeding against him with regard to misconduct alleged to
have been committed prior to the time he became a circuit judge
and while he held an office not within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission (he was a judge of a criminal court of record). The court
held that prohibition was an inappropriate remedy since prohibition
can issue only to a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal with decision-
making power, while the Commission can only make recommenda-
tions to the supreme court. However, the court exercised jurisdiction
under its "all writs" authority, coupled with its authority to adopt
rules regulating the Commission's proceedings.
On the merits, the court held that a public officer may not be
removed from office for misconduct which he committed in another
public office or in a prior term of office unless express constitutional
language provides otherwise. Article V, section 12(a) was amended
in 1974 to authorize discipline of judges if past conduct demon-
strates present unfitness. However, since the instant case was de-
cided before the 1974 amendment and since the pre-1974 Florida
50. 295 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1974).
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Constitution contained no provision contrary to the general rule, the
relator was entitled to the relief requested. The court stated that the
Commission might investigate within a reasonable time (but not
exceeding 2 years51) before a present term of office only when such
investigation was in relation to a charge of misconduct occurring in
a present term of office; prior conduct could not, standing alone,
serve as a basis for discipline. The Commission might also investi-
gate matters occurring within a reasonable time (not exceeding 2
years) before its own origin, where germane to alleged misconduct
occurring after January 1, 1973.
The extent of the Commission's jurisdiction was further deline-
ated in In re Dekle,"2 in which the court granted a motion to dismiss
an original proceeding brought by the Commission against a su-
preme court justice. Although acknowledging that estoppel or res
judicata did not apply with respect to Commission proceedings, the
court nevertheless held that where the Commission, according to its
own rules and regulations, had taken a formal vote which was not a
sufficient basis on which to make an affirmative recommendation,
the Commission was without further jurisdiction and could not
bring an action before the supreme court absent a taking of further
evidence or a showing of why the matter should be deferred.
Once the Commission has so recommended by the vote of two-
thirds of its members, the supreme court is authorized to order that
a justice or judge be reprimanded or removed from office "for willful
or persistent failure to perform his duties or for other conduct unbe-
coming a member of the judiciary."" In re Dekle54 and In re Boyd"5
clarified the extent of this authority and of the standards for the
discipline of judges. Both cases dealt with an ex parte memorandum
given to the two justices by an attorney representing parties in a
case before the court. Both justices were publicly reprimanded by
the court-Justice Dekle for utilizing a memorandum which he
knew or should have known was ex parte, and Justice Boyd for delay
in bringing the memorandum to the attention of the members of the
court and other interested authorities, and for destroying it. How-
ever, in neither case did the court follow the recommendation of the
51. The two-year limit was derived by analogy from the statute of limitations for noncap-
ital crimes. Id. at 618 n.9.
52. 308 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975).
53. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(d).
54. 308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975).
55. 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975).
[Vol. 30:277
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Judicial Qualifications Commission that both justices be removed
from office for conduct unbecoming a judge.
In Justice Dekle's case, the court found that the memorandum
had no effect on his vote. Although he had used the memorandum
in preparation of what was originally to be a dissenting opinion, the
revised opinion which became that of the majority was based only
on the briefs and record filed. The court also found that Justice
Boyd was not influenced improperly in the decision since he took a
position which was contrary to that expressed in the memorandum.
Moreover, there was contradictory evidence as to whether the attor-
ney gave Justice Boyd the memorandum with the latter's knowl-
edge.
The court noted that objective, and not merely subjective, mis-
conduct warrants judicial discipline and that a judge may be guilty
of misconduct even if there is no implication of harm to any litigant.
However, the court found that the constitution places within the
court's sound discretion the determination of the measure and ex-
tent of discipline in each individual case of judicial misconduct.
By analogy to attorney disbarment cases, the court ruled that
judges, while held to even stricter ethical standards than attorneys,
should not be subjected to the extreme discipline of removal ex-
cept in instances where it is free from doubt that they intention-
ally committed serious and grievous wrongs of a clearly unre-
deeming nature."
Thus, in the absence of a clear showing of corrupt motive or deliber-
ate or intentional wrong, the court found that Justice Dekle's impro-
priety and laxness and Justice Boyd's impropriety did not consti-
tute dishonesty or moral turpitude warranting removal from office.
Following the Dekle and Boyd decisions, the legislature passed
a proposed constitutional amendment57 making it clear that a judge
could be unseated for unethical conduct even if no bad faith or
corrupt motive is proved. The amendment would also disqualify
supreme court justices from considering Judicial Qualifications
Commission recommendations affecting a member of their own
court; a panel of seven chief circuit judges, selected on the basis of
seniority, would act on such recommendations. On finding probable
cause to believe a judge guilty of misconduct, the Commission
56. Id. at 21.
57. H.. Res. 1709, 119751 Fla. Laws 1123.
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would be required under the amendment to hold public rather than
secret trials. In addition, the amendment would give the Commis-
sion access to information held by grand juries. The proposed
amendment is subject to voter approval in the November 1976 gen-
eral election.
4. RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN LITIGATION
Stem bridge v. Harwitz58 restated the well-established rule that
where a trial court unnecessarily reaches a question of the constitu-
tionality of a law, the part of the opinion dealing with the constitu-
tional issue is to be treated as advisory rather than an issue in the
case, and the final judgment should be amended to eliminate a
holding of unconstitutionality.
Duran v. Wells"9 involved an allegation that the Florida crimi-
nal legal process was being used to collect back rent from migrant
workers. The plaintiff had recently been convicted' " of the crime of
obtaining lodging with intent to defraud the owner. In a separate
proceeding she brought an individual action against the landlord for
damages, a class action for declaratory judgment that the statute
was unconstitutional, and sought injunctive relief against its en-
forcement and expungement of arrest and conviction records of all
persons arrested and/or convicted under the statute. She alleged
that the statute violated the Florida Constitution's proscription
against imprisonment for debt' and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The court found that the constitutional
questions were not properly presented since, as a general rule, the
question of the validity of a criminal statute should be raised only
as a defense to a prosecution, or in an action alleging imminent
threat of prosecution. Finding no justiciable controversy on the
constitutional question, the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, affirmed the lower court's grant of the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
5. COURTS GENERALLY
A circuit court judge is empowered under Florida Statutes sec-
tion 27.16 (1973) to appoint an acting state attorney to serve as
58. 303 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
59. 307 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
60. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 509.151 (1973).
61. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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temporary prosecutor when a vacancy exists due to nonappointment
by the Governor and when the regular state attorney is absent at a
term of the court or is present but unable to or disqualified from
performing the duties of that office. The supreme court in State ex
rel. Harris v. McCauley62 made clear that the statute is only a recog-
nition of an inherent power of the circuit court. A circuit court judge
is not circumscribed in selecting an acting state attorney by any
statutory or constitutional qualifications for a regular state attorney
or assistant state attorney. Thus, a duly appointed acting state
attorney may validly sign felony informations, although a member
of the bar less than 5 years and consequently not qualified under
article V, section 17 of the Florida Constitution to hold office as a
state attorney.
C. Legislature
1. INVESTIGATIONS
In Forbes v. Earle,"' the supreme court denied a petition for writ
of mandamus sought by the chairman of the House Subcommittee
on the Judiciary. The Subcommittee sought to compel the chairman
of the Judicial Qualifications Commission to present to the Sub-
committee all the Commission's files containing information on as-
serted judicial misconduct which could lead to impeachment, and
to testify concerning these matters. Article V, section 12(c) of the
Florida Constitution provides that the record of the proceedings
before the Commission shall be made public after a recommenda-
tion of removal of any justice or judge, thus implying to the supreme
court a requirement of confidentiality before the recommendation.
While finding valid reasons supporting this requirement, the court
recognized that it must be read in pari materia with article III,
section 5 (granting the legislature subpoena power during investiga-
tions) and article III, section 17 (authorizing the speaker of the
house to appoint a committee to investigate charges against any
officer subject to impeachment). The court expressed the opinion
that the speaker of the house or his designated representative could
examine, in camera and in the presence of the Chief Justice or his
representative, matters and investigative files of the Judicial Quali-
fications Commission that concern a named officer who, in the
62. 297 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1974).
63. 298 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974).
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Speaker's opinion, may be subject to an impeachment investiga-
tion. The court pointed out that the "raw files" of the commission
would not qualify as evidence in impeachment proceedings, but that
these files should be available under the procedure mentioned above
as a means of developing presentable evidence in any appropriate
impeachment proceeding. In Forbes, however, no specific charges
had been made against any officer and no impeachment committee
had been appointed. The court did not believe that article III, sec-
tion 17 authorized such a sweeping investigation of the class of
officers subject to impeachment, and it therefore denied the petition
for writ of mandamus.
2. SPECIAL LAWS
In Dickinson v. Bradley, 4 the supreme court held that a claim
bill, although restricted to a designated person, is nevertheless val-
idly enacted as a general law and does not have to meet the notice
or referendum requirement applicable to special laws. The purpose
of notice with respect to a special law is to inform people in the
locality affected and to allow those opposed to attempt to prevent
its enactment. The claim bill in question65 provided for the State of
Florida to pay the plaintiff out of "general county funds." Finding
no funds designated as such and finding an unmistakable legislative
intent to compensate the plaintiff, the court construed the source
of funds to be the general revenue fund of the state. Thus, since the
act as interpreted by the court did not appropriate the funds of any
locality, the court found the requirement of notice to be unnecessary
in the instant case.
Brandon Planning and Zoning Authority v. Burns" held uncon-
stitutional a special act 7 which purported to transfer zoning juris-
diction over an area of the county from the Board of County Com-
missioners to the appellant Authority and to empower the Authority
to enact county zoning ordinances which the commissioners and
other county officials would have to obey and enforce.
The supreme court found that the act pertained to "election,
jurisdiction or duties of officers, except officers of municipalities,
chartered counties, special districts or local governmental agen-
64. 298 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1974).
65. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-468.
66. 304 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1974).
67. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-564.
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cies," one of the topics which, under article III, section 11, may not
be the subject of a special law or general law of local application.
The court adopted the rationale of the trial court which pointed
out that a special act is not invalid where its main purpose is valid
and constitutional, and where the effect upon the jurisdiction or
duties of the county officers is merely incidental to the main pur-
poses or where the special act only adds to the officers' duties.
However, a special act must be held unconstitutional where the
purpose is to usurp rights, powers and privileges conferred by gen-
eral law on county officers.
D. Executive
1. GOVERNOR-GENERAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
In Austin v. State ex rel. Christian,"8 the Supreme Court of
Florida considered the extent of the Governor's power to assign a
state attorney to discharge the duties of another state attorney.
Article V, section 17 of the Florida Constitution provides that a
state attorney "shall perform other duties prescribed by general
law." Pursuant to this provision the legislature had enacted statutes
permitting the Governor to require one state attorney to assist an-
other state attorney in the discharge of the latter's duties"9 and to
assign one state attorney to another circuit to discharge the duties
of the circuit's regular state attorney if the latter was disqualified
or to order the exchange of state attorneys if the Governor felt that
the ends of justice would be best served by such exchange. 0 Acting
under these statutes, the Governor, by executive order, had assigned
the state attorney of the Fourth Judicial Circuit to discharge such
duties of the state attorney of the Second Judicial Circuit as related
to allegations or reports concerning the Commissioner of Education.
The order further authorized the assigned state attorney to desig-
nate one or more of his duly qualified assistant state attorneys to
work with him. No contention was made that the state attorney of
the Second Judicial Circuit was disqualified or otherwise unable to
act, but only that great demands were placed on his resources by
his agreement to assist the state attorney in the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit. The district court of appeal,71 while holding the statutes
68. 310 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1975).
69. FLA. STAT. § 27.15 (1973).
70. FLA. STAT. § 27.14 (1973).
71. State ex rel. Christian v. Austin, 302 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
constitutional, had strictly construed the statutes and had held the
assignment of the state attorney and his assistants to be invalid
since there had not been an exchange of state attorneys and since
the assigned state attorney had conducted the investigation of the
Commissioner of Education without supervision by the regular state
attorney. The supreme court refused to strictly construe the statutes
and reversed the district court's holding that the assignment of the
state attorney was not within the scope of the statutes. The supreme
court, however, did hold the assignment of assistant state attorneys
to be invalid since such assignment was not expressly authorized by
the statutes.72 Consequently, in a companion case,73 the supreme
court found invalid indictments which had been handed down by
the grand jury before which the illegally assigned assistant state
attorneys had appeared.
In an advisory opinion,74 the supreme court clarified the cir-
cumstances in which the Governor, at the beginning of his second
term, must reappoint officers who had been appointed during the
preceding term under statutes which provide for service at the plea-
sure of the Governor. Article III, section 13 of the Florida Constitu-
tion prohibits the creation of any office with a term exceeding 4
years. However, the court had earlier held that article IV, section 6
creates an express exception to the 4-year limitation. The court
advised the Governor that where the initial appointment required
confirmation of the Senate and the statute requires reappointment
or replacement at the discretion of the Governor, a new appoint-
ment is required; where the initial appointment required approval
of three members of the Cabinet and confirmation of the Senate
and the official, by statute, serves at the pleasure of the Governor
and Cabinet, no reappointment would be required; where the offi-
cial serves at the pleasure of the Governor, but no requirement of
Senate confirmation of the appointment exists and no express re-
quirement of reappointment or replacement at the discretion of the
Governor is made by statute, the official need not be reappointed
and would continue to serve at the pleasure of the Governor.
72. The statute was subsequently amended to expressly provide for the assignment of
assistant state attorneys. See FLA. STAT. § 27.14 (Supp. 1974).
73. Rudd v. State ex rel. Christian, 310 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1975).
74. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 306 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1975).
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2. SUSPENSIONS
By vote of four to three, the justices of the supreme court ad-
vised the Governor that a superintendent of schools who has been
employed by the district school board pursuant to the local option
under article IX, section 5 is not subject to the Governor's power of
suspension."5 The new option provided by the 1968 constitution was
said to be more than merely a change in the means of selection of
the superintendent. It provided an option to make the superintend-
ent a local employee subject to local control by the school board
rather than an elected, constitutional officer subject to state control
by the executive. When the electors have chosen to have an em-
ployed superintendent, only the district school board has power to
remove him.
E. Vacancies in Office
Under article V, section 11(a), the Governor is authorized to fill
vacancies in judicial office by appointing one of not fewer than three
persons nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating commis-
sion. The Governor's power to fill vacancies extends only to appoint-
ment to a term ending on the first Tuesday after the first Monday
in January of the year following the next primary and general elec-
tion rather than to the total unexpired term of the judge vacating.
The Governor requested the advice of the supreme court in
regard to this power of appointment when a circuit court judge and
a district court judge submitted resignations prior to the primary
and general elections in the fall of 1974. Although the words "pri-
mary and general election" seem to have a clear meaning on their
face, the supreme court construed them to mean the non-partisan
judicial election process established by the legislature in Florida
Statutes section 105.021 (1973). The court advised76 the Governor to
fill the vacancies by appointment of new judges to a term expiring
after the judicial elections in 1976 instead of after the elections in
1974.
The advisory opinion also stated that a vacancy in office does
not occur until the office actually becomes vacant, except in cases
of artificial vacancies created by the "resign-to-run" law77 and the
75. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 298 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1974).
76. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 301 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1974).
77. FLA. STAT. § 99.012 (Supp. 1974). For a discussion of the statute, see 1974 Survey,
supra note 1, at 593-94.
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vacancy created under the circumstances present in Spector v.
Glisson.7 1
In Spector, Justice Ervin, who was to reach the mandatory
retirement age on January 26, 1975, had stated by letter in February
1974 that he would resign unconditionally effective January 6, 1975.
The court held that there was an immediate vacancy for the office
which was subject to an election and granted a writ of mandamus
to compel the Secretary of State to accept qualifying papers and fees
of the petitioner and intervenor as candididates for justice of the
Supreme Court of Florida in the election of September 10, 1974. The
court stated that the authority to fill vacancies by appointment
arises only in those instances where the elective process is not avail-
able and there is a need for someone to fill an interim judgeship so
that the business of the courts can continue. According to the court
in Spector, an intervening election should be utilized to choose the
successor in situations where a known vacancy must mandatorily
occur in conjunction with and reasonably before a judicial election.
Thus, in Spector the court determined that the resignation of
Justice Ervin created an immediate vacancy. However, in its ad-
visory opinion the court determined that in the case of the resigna-
tions of the district court and circuit judges, the vacancy would not
occur until the effective date of the resignation. The advisory opin-
ion distinguished Spector by stating that in that case there was
ample time to fill the vacancy in an appropriate election and that
the effective date of the vacancy coincided with the commencement
of the terms of other judicial officers elected during the same elec-
tion process.
A special act, increasing by two the membership of Broward
County's school board, became effective after approval at a referen-
dum held on September 10, 1974, the same day as the first primary
election. Florida Statutes section 100.111(6)(b) (1973) provides in
substance that where a "vacancy in nomination" exists after Sep-
tember 15th, no special election shall be held, but the county chair-
men of the political parties shall be notified in order that the parties
may decide either to provide a nominee for their party or resolve not
to offer a candidate for the office in the general election. Since in
the instant case there was no chance for selecting nominees in a
special primary election before September 15, 1974, the supreme
78. 305 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1975).
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court advised" the Governor that the provisions of section
100.111(6)(b) governed. Should both parties, however, decline to
offer a candidate, it would become the duty of the Governor to fill
the offices by appointment.
No note was taken of the apparent conflict between the statute
as interpreted by the court and the Florida Constitution. Article X,
section 3 provides that a vacancy in office occurs upon the creation
of an office. It could be argued, therefore, that a vacancy in office
occurred when the act creating the two new school board positions
became effective on the date of the favorable referendum. Article
IV, section 1(f) would then empower the Governor to fill the vacancy
by appointment without requiring the Governor to defer to the polit-
ical parties should they decide to provide a nominee for the office
in the general election.
According to the Attorney General of Florida in an opinion to
the Governor,'" section 100.111(6)(b) is also applicable to the elec-
tion of successors to fill vacancies in judgeships which occur under
circumstances when it is too late for a successor to qualify during
the statutory qualifying period.
III. ORGANS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Counties
The Attorney General has taken the position that until legisla-
tive or judicial clarification to the contrary, it is the safer course to
assume that the board of commissioners of noncharter counties are
not authorized to adopt rent control ordinances."'
B. Municipalities
The constitutional grant of power to municipalities provides
that they
shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to
enable them to conduct municipal government, perform munici-
pal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise
any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided
by law."'
79. Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 302 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1974).
80. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-228 (Aug. 6, 1974).
81. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 075-91 (Apr. 3, 1975). Under FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 1(f), non-
charter counties have only those powers of self-government specifically granted by law.
82. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b).
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In City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc."~ the supreme
court had held that this provision did not empower a city to enact
an ordinance on rent control. However, since the Fleetwood Hotel
decision, the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act 4 has expanded
municipal power to include any power not expressly prohibited by
law."5 City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc." unanimously held
that the Act validly empowered a municipality to enact rent control
ordinances in appropriate circumstances as a proper municipal pur-
pose. A majority of five agreed with the trial court that the evidence
presented at trial did not overcome the city council's finding that
an emergency existed sufficient to support enactment of the ordi-
nance. However, by a vote of four to three, the court found that the
ordinance was constitutionally defective for lack of sufficient objec-
tive guidelines accompanying the delegation of legislative power to
the rent control administrator. Justice Dekle in his concurring opin-
ion found the guidelines to be arbitrary, unreasonable, confiscatory
and a denial of due process.
In United Sanitation Services, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 7 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, held that a city may operate
a garbage collection service within its territory as a city-owned mo-
nopoly since garbage collection is an essential public service. This
function, according to the court, should not be regarded as an exer-
cise of the police power, and therefore the city need not demonstrate
a relationship between the function and the public health, safety or
welfare.
Provision of police services is also within the municipal powers.
Nevertheless, the state legislature may restrict the exercise of this
power. A special statute" providing that police officers in the City
of Miami should not be required to work more than 40 hours a week
was upheld in Reese v. Thorne. 9 Although the City of Miami
Charter' gave the police chief a broad range of powers over the
police force, subject to the supervision of the Director of Public
Safety, the supreme court observed that the charter did not and
83. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
84. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-129, creating FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1973).
85. See FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1973).
86. 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
87. 302 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
88. Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 30989.
89. 297 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
90. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10847.
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could not validly confer absolute powers upon the police chief. The
statute was characterized as "merely one restriction, easily adminis-
tered on the police chief's large array of powers,"'" and therefore
compatible with the charter as construed. In two opinions,92 the
Attorney General pointed out that in the absence of a general law
allowing it to do so, a municipality may not extend fire or police
protection beyond its territorial limits when not authorized by mu-
nicipal charter or other special law. The Attorney General found it
doubtful that under Florida Statutes section 163.01 (1973), two ci-
ties could validly enter into an agreement providing for a consoli-
dated police department under the supervision and control of an
administrative entity independent of either city. However, under
article VIII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, the cities could,
with the approval of the electorate of each city, contract for the
performance of law enforcement duties by the police force of one city
in the other under the joint supervision and control of the cities'
police chiefs.93
In Bubier v. State ex rel. Crane,94 the district court held that a
city commission may not effectively abolish a department estab-
lished in its charter by the simple expedient of not appropriating
city funds for the operation of the department. The case arose prior
to October 1, 1973, the effective date of Florida Statutes section
166.031(5) (1973), which gives a municipal governing body authority
to amend its charter. The narrow holding would still seem to be
valid law, however, in that under section 166.031(5) the charter may
be amended and municipal departments abolished only by unani-
mous vote of the governing body.
C. Consolidation
Albury v. City of Jacksonville Beach" held that certain former
municipalities which had been expressly excluded from the consoli-
dation of the City of Jacksonville continued to exist as quasi-
municipal corporations, empowered to exercise all municipal func-
tions which they were permitted to perform under their original
91. 297 So. 2d at 10.
92. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-222 (Aug. 1, 1974); Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-211 (July 22,
1974).
93. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-220 (Aug. 1, 1974).
94. 299 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
95. 295 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1974).
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charters and the general laws of the state immediately prior to con-
solidation. They have the same rights as duly constituted municipal
corporations to share in, receive and expend revenues allocated by
the federal and state governments. However, when a quasi-
municipality imposes an occupational license tax, the consolidated
government can collect only that tax which would have been paya-
ble to the old Duval County had consolidation never occurred.
IV. ELECTIONS
A. Qualification of Electors
The constitution and statutes prohibit convicted felons from
voting, " but do not require applicants for registration to swear that
they are qualified to vote, only that they are qualified to register. 7
The Supervisor of Elections of Brevard County had modified the
registration oath to provide that the applicant was qualified to vote.
In State v. Parsons,9" the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the right to register to vote could not be encumbered with
oaths broader than required by the constitution, and that the defen-
dant, a convicted felon who had taken the registration oath, could
not be convicted of false swearing for taking an untrue oath which
was neither required nor authorized by law.
B. Minority Political Parties and Independent Candidates
Danciu v. Glisson" involved the constitutionality of the statu-
tory requirement" that an independent candidate for statewide
office submit and have certified on petitions the signatures of 5
percent of the total registered electors of Florida. The court found
that the provisions in question were not an unreasonable means to
control the length of the ballot, thereby assuring orderly and effec-
tive elections. However, the difference between the requirement of
signatures of 5 percent of the electorate for "independent" candi-
dates and 3 percent for "minority party" candidates'"' was held to
be arbitrary. The lower requirement was held to apply to both.
96. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. STAT. § 97.041 (Supp. 1974).
97. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 3; FLA. STAT. § 97.051 (1973).
98. 302 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
99. 302 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1974).
100. FLA. STAT. § 99.152 (Supp. 1974).
101. FLA. STAT. § 101.261(1) (1973).
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C. Municipal Recall Elections
In Hurt v. Naples'02 the supreme court faced the question of
whether a city councilman whose incumbency was being challenged
in a recall election could run in a simultaneous election as a candi-
date to succeed himself if recalled. The court stated as a general
proposition that no one should be denied eligibility to be a candi-
date for public office absent a valid constitutional or statutory dec-
laration of ineligibility. Because the city charter '03 and constitution
were silent on the point, the court held that the recall of the peti-
tioner by a majority vote and his simultaneous election by plurality
as successor councilman must stand.
D. Format of the Ballot
The district court in Nelson v. Robinson'"4 held that a candi-
date has a right to appear on the ballot, but has no right to a
particular place on the ballot, so long as the position given does not
interfere with the voters' right to a full, free and open choice. The
court noted that an election should not be set aside except upon a
showing of a reasonable probability that the results would have been
changed, but for the irregularities complained of. The court also
observed that it was dealing with a claim made after the election
and, in dicta, pointed out that one who does not avail himself of the
opportunity to object to irregularities in the ballot prior to the elec-
tion may not do so thereafter.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS
A. Declaration of Rights
1. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A county zoning ordinance forbidding the issuance of alcoholic
beverage licenses to any new business located within 1500 feet of an
established church was upheld in Horne v. Hernando County.15 The
challenge to its constitutionality was based on an alleged conflict
with federal and state constitutional provisions'06 prohibiting estab-
102. 299 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1974).
103. City of Miami Springs Charter § 30, Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 26037, § 30.
104. 301 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1974).
105. 297 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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lishment of religion. Although the precise question was one of first
impression in Florida, the district court cited Supreme Court of
Florida decisions"'7 on similar questions to the effect that since the
purpose of the ordinance was to promote the general welfare of the
community, and not to promote religion, the ordinance did not vio-
late the constitution. The incidental benefit to religion did not bring
the ordinance within the constitutional proscription.
2. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, ASSEMBLY
With its decision in Town of Lantana v. Pelczynski,'°5 the Su-
preme Court of Florida receded from its 1934 decision in Ex parte
Hawthorne'"9 on the basis of a subsequent United States Supreme
Court decision"" which reached the opposite result. A municipal
ordinance made it unlawful to publish or circulate, or cause to be
published or circulated, any charge or attack against any candidate
during the 7 days preceding an election unless the charge or attack
had been personally served upon the candidate at least 7 days prior
to the election. The ordinance was held unconstitutional as a clear
violation of the first amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, sections 4 and 9 of the Florida Constitution.
In State v Aiuppa,'" the supreme court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Florida statute"' providing penalties for the distri-
bution of obscene material. In answering certified questions which
arose during the trial of an exhibitor of the movie "Deep Throat,"
the Florida court found that the statutory definition of obscenity"3
met the requirement of specificity set out by the United States
Supreme Court in Miller v. California."4 To satisfy this requirement
107. Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Authority, 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971);
Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1970).
108. 303 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1974).
109. 116 Fla. 608, 156 So. 619 (1934).
110. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
111. 298 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974).
112. FLA. STAT. § 847.07 (1973).
113. FLA. STAT. § 847.07(2) (1973) provides:
Considered as a whole and applying community standards, material is obscene
if:
(a) Its predominant appeal is to prurient interest; that is, a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;
(b) It is utterly without redeeming social value; and
(c) In addition, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
describing or representing such matters.
114. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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of specificity the Florida court looked first to the Georgia obscenity
statute"5 upon which the Florida statute was patterned, and then
to the judicial interpretations of that statute by the Supreme Court
of Georgia. The Florida court pointed out that statutes adopted
from one state may be deemed to have been adopted with, and are
governed by, the construction placed on them at the time of their
enactment in Florida by the highest court of the state from which
they were adopted. The supreme court concluded that since the
Georgia court in Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I"' had held that its
previous interpretations of the Georgia obscenity statute supplied
the specificity required by Miller for statutory definitions of obscen-
ity, a similar construction should follow for the Florida statute.
Accordingly, it was found that the Florida statute, properly con-
strued, met the Miller standards.
The court also found that the statutory language was not un-
constitutionally vague and did not violate due process; standing
alone, the language was sufficient to give notice to an offender of the
conduct prohibited.
The questioning in Aiuppa of the Florida statute's definition of
obscenity focused on the fact that the definition was in terms of an
appeal to prurient interests rather than a specific depiction or de-
scription of sexual conduct as mandated by Miller. However, the
majority of the court found that "[t]he intent of the legislature to
regulate the depiction or description of sexual conduct is manifest
from the undeniable fact that sexual conduct is the keystone of
obscenity.""' 7 The majority stated: "We refuse to permit grammati-
cal niceties to frustrate our duty to effectuate legislative intent.""'
As Justice Ervin's dissenting opinion pointed out, the majority's
reasoning seemed to be that since any attempt to regulate other
material would conflict with the first amendment, the legislature
must only have intended to regulate materials depicting sexual con-
duct.
The statute also requires that to be obscene, material must be
shown to be "utterly without redeeming social value." The court
held that the state must continue to make such a showing until the
legislature sees fit to adopt the less stringent Miller test which re-
115. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1972).
116. 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973).
117. 298 So. 2d at 396.
118. Id.
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quires only that the material be shown to be without "serious liter-
ary, artistic, political or scientific value.""' 9
The defendant in State v. Papp'0 had been convicted under
Florida Statutes section 847.011(1)(a) (1969), which forbade
possession, custody or control with intent to sell, lend, give away,
distribute, transmit, show, transmute, or advertise in any man-
ner, [ofl any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immo-
ral, sadistic, or masochistic ...magazine ....
The supreme court had earlier held in State v. Reese'2' that the
same standard regarding the possession of obscene material con-
tained in Florida Statutes section 847.011(2) (1967) was not uncon-
stitutionally vague once the word "immoral," which was severable,
was removed. Although Miller had been decided subsequent to
Reese, the court pointed out that it had clearly affirmed the Reese
ruling in Rhodes v. State'22 and that nothing in Miller abrogated the
ruling in Reese.
Relying on its earlier decision, the supreme court thus held that
once the word "immoral" was eliminated from section
847.011(1) (a), that section did not fail to give adequate notice of the
conduct sought to be proscribed and was not susceptible to attack
on the ground of constitutional vagueness.
In State ex rel. Gerstein v. Walvick Theatre Corp.,"23 a four-to-
three majority of the Supreme Court of Florida relied on the United
States Supreme Court case of Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown'24 in
holding that the statutory provision'5 allowing both criminal and
injunctive relief from proscribed dissemination of obscene material
does not violate standards of due process. The court found that even
acquittal on the criminal charge does not bar injunctive or forfeiture
proceedings to remedy the public wrong of dissemination of obnox-
ious and prohibited materials. Being remedial and not punitive,
civil action for an injunction or forfeiture after termination of the
criminal proceedings is not barred by principles of double jeopardy.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ervin maintained that, because of
119. 413 U.S. at 24.
120. 298 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1974), rehearing denied, 316 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1975).
121. 222 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1969).
122. 283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973).
123. 298 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1974).
124. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
125. FLA. STAT. § 847.011 (1973).
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the later guidelines of Miller, once a criminal trial jury determined
that the same material sought to be suppressed criminally and civ-
illy passes muster locally and is not obscene, the question of obscen-
ity is also settled in any pending action for injunction or forfeiture.
The district court decided in State v. Samscot Enterprises,
Inc. "I that the "irreparable harm" necessary for issuance of
permanent injunctive relief was established by a determination of
obscenity as a matter of law, notwithstanding the absence of addi-
tional proof that the defendant intended to show or exhibit the films
for an additional period. In arriving at the conclusion that injunc-
tive relief and ultimate destruction of the material may follow a
declaration of obscenity and be concomitant therewith, the court
stated: "[Tihe very premise upon which 'obscenity' is based is the
offensive nature of the material and the harm or injury to the public
that such material is likely to cause."'' 7
In Jones v. State,2 ' the Florida statute'29 prohibiting profanity
was upheld as constitutional. The statute provides that "[a]ny
person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene lan-
guage shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . .. .
This language was found sufficient to convey its prohibition to a
person of common understanding.
3. RIGHT TO WORK
Article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution permits public
employees to bargain collectively, but prohibits them from striking.
In order to provide statutory implementation of this provision and
to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between gov-
ernment and its employees, the legislature enacted a law'30 which
grants public employees the right of organization and representa-
tion and which creates a Public Employees Relations Commission
to assist in resolving disputes between government and its employ-
ees. The Commission has power to
resolve questions and controversies concerning claims for recogni-
tion as the bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, determine or
approve units appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining,
126. 297 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
127. Id. at 71.
128. 293 So. 2d 33 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
129. FLA. STAT. § 847.05 (1973).
130. Fla. Law 1974, ch. 74-100, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 447.201 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
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and investigate charges of engagement in prohibited practices 314
and charges of striking by public employees.'
In Auchter Co. v. Florida Department of Commerce, Industrial
Relations Commission,' 2 the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, reversed an order of the Industrial Relations Commission and
held that union carpenters who refused nonunion work were ineligi-
ble to receive unemployment compensation. The carpenters
claimed that it was against union rules to work at a nonunion job
that paid less than union scale and that their acceptance of such
work would result in their being subjected to union discipline and
being deprived of union retirement and medical benefits. The Com-
mission argued that article I, section 6 would not allow the claim-
ants to be forced to jeopardize their right to union benefits as a
condition of qualification for unemployment benefits. In answer to
this, the district court pointed out that any sanctions imposed on
the claimant would be by action of the union and not by the em-
ployer or the State of Florida; it was the union and not the prospec-
tive employer or State of Florida which would foreclose the claim-
ants' rights to unemployment compensation if they chose not to
accept the union sanctions.
4. IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
A later section of this survey'33 includes discussion of the sub-
stantive due process aspects of Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
Strong" 4 and Stewart v. Green."' In these cases the supreme court
sustained the validity of a Florida statute3" which imposes limits on
the circumstances in which the owner or operator of a mobile home
park may evict a mobile home owner. One of the litigated issues was
whether contractual rights would be impaired if the statute was
applied to tenancies which had been created before enactment of
the statutes.
The court characterized the statute as being a reasonable regu-
lation of the remedy, rather than as an impairment of the right,
created by a tenancy. On this basis, the court found that the statute
1:31. FLA. SrAT. § 447.207(6) (Supp. 1974).
132. 304 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1974).
133. See section VI, B infra.
1:34. 300 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1974).
135. 300 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1974).
136. FI.A. STAT. § 83.69 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT. § 83.271 (Supp. 1972).
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could be applied to pre-existing tenancies.
The distinction between rights and remedies arose also in
Ratner v. Hensley.'37 In a suit brought in a Florida court for enforce-
ment of a South Carolina judgment, one of the issues was whether
the South Carolina court had acquired jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. He had been served pursuant to a constructive service statute,
which had been enacted after the cause of action had accrued. The
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the statute could
properly be applied to a pre-existing cause of action, since the stat-
ute dealt with the remedy rather than with the right. The court
observed that, "[w]hile it is true that substantive rights are fixed
as of the time the cause arose, the rights relative to procedural
matters are determined by the law in force at the time the action is
brought." '
5. ACCESS TO COURTS
Whether the tort exemption and limitation on the right to sue
for personal injury damages under Florida's no-fault insurance act,:
violate the right of access to the courts was among the questions
considered by the supreme court in Lasky v. State Farm Insurance
Co.'" The personal injury provisions' of the act limit neither an
injured person's recovery of medical expenses nor any compensation
he may receive for loss of income and loss of earning capacity. They
do, however, prohibit an injured person from recovering for pain and
suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience-intangible personal
injuries-unless his medical expenses exceed $1,000.
After considering the advantages and disadvantages to an in-
jured person under both the traditional tort system and the no-fault
system, the court indicated that the personal injury provisions of
the no-fault act were a reasonable alternative to the traditional tort
remedy. Thus, since a reasonable alternative to the traditional rem-
137. 303 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
138. Id. at 45. However, in Barton v. Keyes Co., 305 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
the court stated:
We note that our recent decision in Ratner v. Hensley . . . may seem to indicate
a holding that all constructive service statutes may be given a retroactive applica-
tion. To the extent that our opinion in Ratner may be given such an interpreta-
tion, we recede therefrom.
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1973).
140. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
141. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.737(1), (2) (1973).
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edy existed, the access to courts provision of the constitution had
not been violated.
In making this determination, the supreme court was faced
with the task of distinguishing Kluger v. White.12 In that case the
supreme court had held invalid as a denial of access to the courts,
the section4 3 of the no-fault act which eliminated tort actions for
property damage less than $550. The court's distinction of the
threshold for property damage recovery from the threshold for in-
tangible personal injuries recovery seems to center around the idea
that the property damage provision denied all recovery if the thresh-
old was not met, while the personal injury provisions deny recovery
of only certain kinds of damages if the threshold is not met. That
this distinction may not be totally convincing does not detract from
the supreme court's conclusion that the personal injury provisions,
taken as a whole, provide a reasonable remedy to persons injured
in automobile accidents.
Following what it termed persuasive dicta in Lasky, the Fourth
District held the no-fault act to be applicable to nonresidents as well
as to residents receiving injuries while passengers in motor vehicles
in Florida.' The court concluded that both have equal access to the
courts, and are thus subject to the same restrictions, limitations and
conditions.
6. IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
The Florida Constitution prohibits a person from being impris-
oned for failure to pay his debts, except in cases of fraud.4 ' A former
husband's obligations under a divorce decree to make mortgage
payments to his ex-wife or her estate until the mortgage was satis-
fied was held by the District Court of Appeal, First District, to be a
payment of a debt for settlement of a property right in Corbin v.
Etheridge."' The husband could not, therefore, be imprisoned for
contempt of court for failing to make the monthly payments.
7. REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS TO SUCCESSFUL DEFENDANT
The constitutional authority'47 for the reimbursement of costs
142. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
143. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1973).
144. Johnson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 297 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
145. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
146. 296 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
147. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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to defendants who have been acquitted or discharged in a criminal
proceeding has been implemented by statute.'48 The statute pro-
vides that if the defendant has paid any taxable costs in the case,
the clerk or judge shall give the successful defendant a certificate
of payment of such costs, which, when audited and approved, shall
be refunded by the county. State v. Nell'49 held that the trial court's
authority does not extend to ordering a board of county commission-
ers to pay costs without certifying them to the board as provided by
statute. The statute leaves to the courts the determination of which
costs must be reimbursed to an acquitted or discharged defendant.
Thus, in Doran v. State,"" the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, refused reimbursement for pretrial bail bond premium and
for the fee charged for towing the petitioner's automobile off the
street following his arrest on charges of driving under the influence
of alcoholic beverages.
B. Substantive Due Process and the Police Power
A statute,'5 ' enacted in 1972 and amended in 1973, provides
that the owner or operator of a mobile home park can evict a mobile
home owner only on one of the grounds listed in the statute. In
summary, the permissible grounds are: (1) nonpayment of rent; (2)
conviction of a violation of law deemed detrimental to other dwellers
in the park; (3) violation of any reasonable rule or regulation which
has been established and duly publicized by the park owner or
operator; or (4) change in the use of the land for a purpose other
than a mobile home park. The supreme court sustained this statute,
as a reasonable exercise of the police power, in the companion cases
of Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong '12 and Stewart v.
Green.'3 The court observed that the mobile home industry, which
provides accomodation for some 700,000 Floridians, "peculiarly af-
fects the public interest and bears a substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare."'' 4 This charac-
terization evidently brings the industry into the category of a "busi-
148. FLA. STAT. § 939.06 (1973).
149. 297 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
150. 296 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); accord, Wood v. City of Jacksonville, 248 So. 2d
176 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
151. FLA. STAT. § 83.69 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT. § 83.271 (Supp. 1972).
152. 300 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1974).
153. 300 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1974).
154. 300 So. 2d at 884; 300 So. 2d at 891.
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ness affected with a public interest," regulation of which is strongly
presumed to be a reasonable exercise of the police power."' The
challengers in these cases were unable to overcome the presumption
in favor of validity. The court noted that mobile home spaces were
in short supply in many areas of the state; consequently, an evicted
mobile home owner might experience serious difficulty and exorbi-
tant expense in obtaining a new location. In this economic situation,
the court sustained the reasonableness of the legislative decision to
extend special protection to mobile home owners, as a class threat-
ened with oppressive treatment.
In addition, dictum suggests that if eviction is attempted on the
basis of a tenant's violation of the park's rules and regulations, the
courts will carefully scrutinize the rules, not only as written but also
as applied, so as to provide the tenant with judicial protection
against arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
In Thomas v. City of West Palm Beach,' on conflict certiorari,
the supreme court reviewed a district court of appeal decision on the
validity of a municipal ordinance.' 7 The ordinance' authorized a
city building official to order the demolition, removal, or vacating
of any dwelling found unfit or unsafe for human habitation, or the
repair of any such dwelling if the cost of repair would not exceed 50
percent of the value of the structure after repair. The ordinance
defined "unfit or unsafe" dwellings as those which were
structurally unsafe, unstable, unsanitary, inadequately provided
with exit facilities, constituting a fire hazard, unsuitable or im-
proper for the use or occupancy to which they are put, constitut-
ing a hazard to health or safety because of inadequate mainte-
nance, dilapidation, obsolescence or abandonment, dangerous to
life or property or otherwise in violation of the Housing Code, as
well as the Building Code (chapter 10), the Electrical Code
(chapter 19) and the Plumbing Code (chapter 36).
155. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 608-09.
156. 299 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974).
157. The constitution provides for appeals to the supreme court from decisons which pass
upon the validity of a state or federal statute. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(1). However,
decisions which pass upon the validity of a municipal ordinance are not appealable to the
supreme court, but instead are disposed of by the district court of appeal. Callendar v. State,
181 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1966); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 164 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1964). The
district court decision in such a case may be reviewed in the supreme court only if some other
jurisdictional basis for supreme court review can be found. In the case under discussion, the
supreme court's conflict certiorari jurisdiction was invoked.
158. WEST PALM BEACH, FLA., CODE art. II, § 27-19 (1967), quoted in 299 So. 2d at 12-13.
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The official had to give written notice and time for compliance, and
any aggrieved party could obtain an administrative hearing, fol-
lowed by judicial review.
First, the court found sufficient standards and procedures to
sustain the ordinance against attack as an improper delegation. The
court particularly noted the incorporation by reference of the Hous-
ing, Building, Electrical and Plumbing Codes.
Next, the court sustained the ordinance as a reasonable exercise
of the municipal police power, for the protection of the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare. Recognizing that all en-
actments are presumed valid, the court observed that "viewed in
the most favorable light to Petitioner we find the ordinances fairly
debatable, which requires our approval thereof."'' 1
As precedents for using the "fairly debatable" test, the Thomas
opinion cited Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee
Airport Authority' ° and Lester v. City of St. Petersburg."' In
Harrell's Candy Kitchen the supreme court applied the "fairly de-
batable" test to a zoning ordinance, observing that the test had
become well established for use in such cases. 2 In Lester, the dis-
trict court of appeal used the "fairly debatable" test to examine the
validity of a municipal housing code, citing Harrell's Candy
Kitchen and commenting that the test was applicable not only in
zoning cases, but also to cases involving "any regulation enacted for
the public welfare."'' 3 The Thomas opinion evidently adopts the
Lester view, since Thomas applies the "fairly debatable" test to a
housing code.
Of course the words "fairly debatable" contain no magic, but
they have provided a convenient means of separating zoning litiga-
tion from other matters, with the implication that the standards for
judicial review may be different in zoning cases than in other situa-
tions. If the court decided that Thomas provided an appropriate
opportunity to abandon the distinction between the standards for
judicial review in zoning and in other litigation involving regula-
tions for the public welfare, a clear statement to this effect, together
with supporting rationale, would have made the Thomas opinion
more helpful.
159. 299 So. 2d at 15.
160. 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
161. 183 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
162. 111 So. 2d at 443-44.
163. 183 So. 2d at 591.
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In Zarsky v. State,"' a motorist had received 15 convictions for
moving traffic violations within a 5-year period. Following an ad-
ministrative hearing, the state suspended his driver's license for 5
years, as required in such situations by the habitual traffic offender
statute.' ' The supreme court sustained the statute against chal-
lenges on several grounds.
First, the court held the statute to be a reasonable exercise of
the police power. The court reaffirmed the traditional view that
"reasonable regulation of an individual's right to drive is in the
interest of public good,"'60 and later took the inconsistent position
that a driver's license is a "privilege as opposed to a right.' 7 By
reaching the same result whether a driver's license is called a privi-
lege or a right, the court demonstrated, albeit unintentionally, that
these terms do not help with the decision of police power cases.
Evidently, the government must follow fair procedures, even-
handed treatment and rational decisionmaking whether dealing
with rights or privileges. The distinction between rights and privi-
leges, at least in the context of police power cases, seems to be little
more than an exercise in rhetoric.
Second, the court found that the suspension or revocation of a
driver's license is not cruel and unusual punishment, and indeed not
punishment at all, but merely a measure for the protection of the
public. The court made no attempt to distinguish Pauline v.
Borer,"" in which the same court had held, just one year previously,
that the suspension of a real estate broker's license in the circum-
stances of the case was too "harsh and unusual," and that public
reprimand would be the appropriate penalty. A possible distinction
is that the statute in Pauline conferred significant discretion upon
an administrative agency to determine the sanction, while the ha-
bitual traffic offender statute in Zarsky specified the sanction pre-
cisely if the agency found certain facts.
Third, in response to an argument on equal protection grounds,
the court found that the statute created a reasonable classification,
and provided equal treatment for all persons falling within the class.
Finally, the court noted that the ex post facto rule did not preclude
the statute from imposing an enhanced sanction on habitual offend-
164. 300 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1974).
165. FLA. STAT. § 322.27(5) (1973).
166. 300 So. 2d at 263 (emphasis added).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. 274 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
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ers, even though part of the conduct giving rise to the sanction had
occurred prior to enactment of the statute. Prior case law had sus-
tained the validity of enhanced criminal sanctions under habitual
offender statutes; the principle applies a fortiori where the sanction
is characterized as remedial rather than punitive.
C. Equal Protection
In Brown v. Bray,"9 a section of the Florida bastardy law was
challenged, on the ground that it violated equal protection by dis-
criminating against the father of an illegitimate child, as compared
to the father of a legitimate child. The alleged discrimination was
the contrast between the dissolution of marriage statute, where both
parents are eligible for consideration as custodians of the child, and
the bastardy statute, which appeared to eliminate the father as a
candidate for custodian. The bastardy statute"" provides, in part,
that if the circuit court determines that the defendant is father of
the child, the court shall order the defendant
to pay the complainant, her guardian or such other person assum-
ing responsibility for the child as the judge may direct, such sum
or sums as shall be sufficient to pay reasonable attorney's fee,
hospital or medical expenses, cost of confinement and any other
expenses incident to the birth of such child. In addition the court
shall order the defendant to pay periodically for the support of
such child such sums as shall be fixed by the court in accordance
with the provisions of this act . ...
The supreme court acknowledged that the statute would violate
the fourteenth amendment, under such decisions as Levy v.
Louisiana' and Stanley v. Illinois,7 ' if it were interpreted as pre-
venting the father from being considered as custodian. However, the
court considered the statutory language broad enough to authorize
the circuit court, in its discretion, to award custody to the father,
and to order him to pay for the child's support commensurate with
such custody. So construed, the court found the statute constitu-
tional.
The regulations of the Board of Regents impose a certain regis-
tration fee upon students who have been citizens of Florida for at
169. 300 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1974).
170. FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1973).
171. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
172. 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
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least one year immediately preceding the first day of classes of the
current term, and a higher fee upon students who do not satisfy that
requirement. Weitzel v. State"' sustained the validity of the distinc-
tion. Relying heavily on dictum in Vlandis v. Kline,'74 the District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that the tuition differential
based upon a durational citizenship requirement was a reasonable
classification that did not violate the fourteenth amendment. The
court added, without discussion, that no provision of the Florida
Constitution was violated either.
In Perkins v. Florida State University,"5 petitioner was a com-
puter operator who had been dismissed by the university. Following
an unfavorable decision by the Career Service Commission on his
petition for review, he asked the university for a free transcript of
those proceedings so that he could seek judicial review. The univer-
sity refused his request, although the university as a matter of policy
furnished free transcripts to other classes of personnel, including
faculty members, in similar circumstances. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, found no legal requirement that free tran-
scripts be furnished to any dismissed employee. "However," said
the court, "having elected to do so for some, respondents must do
so for all."' 6 The court emphasized that its opinion was based, not
upon the indigency of the petitioner, but upon the requirement of
equal treatment in disciplinary matters and proceedings of all em-
ployees of a single state agency or entity. Further, the court ordered
the university to furnish only such portions of the transcript as
might be necessary for judicial review, under the guidelines of
Draper v. Washington"' and Cueni v. State.'5 The court supported
its decision by referring to the fourteenth amendment and to the
equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution.
Sattler v. Askew'79 involved a challenge, on equal protection
grounds, against the method of allocating state road funds. The case
will be discussed in a later section."60
17:3. 306 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
174. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
175. 303 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1975).
176. Id. at 416.
177. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
178. 303 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 738 (Fla.), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 64 (1975).
179. 295 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1974).
180. See text accompanying notes 337-39 infra.
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An opinion of the Attorney General'' ruled that publicly owned
and operated utilities may not charge lower rates to the class of
consumers over 65 years old than to others. The equal protection
principle precludes any classification for rate purposes, except on a
basis reasonably related to the service provided.
D. Zoning
A city ordinance' provided, in part:
No House Car, Camp Car, Camper or House Trailer, nor any
vehicle, or part of vehicle, designed or adaptable for human habi-
tation, by whatever name known, . . . shall be kept or parked on
public or private property within the City, except if enclosed
within the confines of a garage, and unoccupied ....
City of Coral Gables v. Wood ' 3 upheld the ordinance, at least
as applied in the circumstances of the case. First, the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, disposed of a challenge addressed to the
vagueness of the ordinance. The court recognized that some doubt
could arise as to whether or not certain types of vehicles were cov-
ered, but found without question that the Apache vehicle at issue
in the case was a "camper" as contemplated by the ordinance.
Next, the court resolved the substantive due process question,
stating the principle that a zoning ordinance should be sustained
"unless it is clearly shown that it has no foundation in reason and
is a mere arbitrary exercise of power without reference to public
health, morals, safety or welfare."'' 8 The court did not use or even
mention the "fairly debatable" test, which has been traditionally
applied in zoning cases.8 5 Since this case dealt with the validity of
a zoning ordinance without using the "fairly debatable" test, while
that test was applied in the non-zoning context of Thomas v. City
of West Palm Beach, noted under a previous section, ' ! it appears
that the "fairly debatable" test can no longer be closely identified
with litigation on the validity of zoning ordinances. The comment
made earlier in connection with Thomas is reiterated: if the courts
decide to abandon the traditional "fairly debatable" test for zoning
181. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-212 (July 22, 1974).
182. CORAL GABLES, FLA., ZONING CODE § 4.09(a) (1972), quoted in 305 So. 2d at 262-63.
183. 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
184. Id. at 263.
185. See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 156-59 supra.
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ordinances, the courts should explain the reasons for doing so, and
consider the implications of this departure on future litigation.
The Wood opinion sustained the ordinance as a valid exercise
of the police power for aesthetic purposes, namely, for "preventing
unsightly appearances and diminution of property values which
obtain when camper-type vehicles are parked or stored out of doors
in a residential area of the community."'' 7 The court found that the
ordinance carried out this purpose in a reasonable manner, since it
did not limit the right to own such vehicles, but merely regulated
the parking or storage of them.
The "fairly debatable" test was at issue in Allstate Mortgage
Corp. of Florida v. City of Miami Beach.'88 An ordinance"' author-
ized the board of adjustment to grant variances "[wlhere there are
practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in carrying out the
strict letter" of a zoning ordinance. The circuit court, applying the
"fairly debatable" test, sustained a decision of the board of adjust-
ment granting a variance on grounds of hardship. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, reversed and remanded, holding that the
circuit court had erred in applying the "fairly debatable" test. The
correct test should have been whether the applicant for a variance
had demonstrated "unique or unnecessary hardship," a standard
derived partly from the above-quoted ordinance, and partly from
the 1957 supreme court decision in Josephson v. Autrey.""' Evi-
dently, this standard imposes a heavier burden on the applicant
than would be required under the "fairly debatable" test. The
Allstate Mortgage decision is consistent with prior authorities;" ' the
"fairly debatable" test developed as a standard for the judicial re-
view of zoning legislation, not for review of adjudications by boards
of adjustment.
A result similar to Allstate Mortgage was reached by the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Monterey Development
Co. v. Stuart Marine Center, Inc.9' A special statute"'" authorized
the board of zoning adjustment to grant variances where, "owing to
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
187. 305 So. 2d at 263.
188. 308 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1975).
189. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., RELATED LAWS § 34, quoted in 305 So. 2d at 631.
190. 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957).
191. See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
192. 305 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
193. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-2466, § 5.
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[zoning ordinance] will result in unnecessary and undue hard-
ship." Relying on this language and prior case law, the court found
the applicant entitled to a variance, having demonstrated a "unique
hardship."'' 4
However, the "fairly debatable" test was applied to a petition
for rezoning a specific parcel of property, in a situation more analo-
gous to a variance than to general zoning legislation, in Duval Pro-
ductions, Inc. v. City of Tampa."'5 The owner of a sub-standard
sized lot in a residential zone petitioned for rezoning to a classifica-
tion which would permit construction of a billboard. The lot was the
remnant of a larger tract, after a partial taking through the exercise
of eminent domain, in which the owner's predecessor had been enti-
tled to severance damages. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, indulged in the presumption that the predecessor had re-
ceived proper compensation, including severance damages. Accord-
ingly, the new owner had no absolute right to rezoning on the basis
of the prior partial taking. The question before the zoning board was
therefore whether the billboard classification would be appropriate
to the parcel in question. The board's determination was negative,
and the court found this "fairly debatable,"'' 6 and therefore sustain-
able.
In the companion cases of City of St. Petersburg v.
Schweitzer"'7 and City of St. Petersburg v. Austin,"' the trial courts
issued peremptory writs of mandamus to compel the city to grant
special exceptions and to issue building permits. The trial courts
accepted petitioners' contentions that the zoning ordinances, which
provided that the planning commission "may" permit special ex-
ceptions of the type requested, contained insufficient standards to
guide the commission in the exercise of its discretion; that this
portion of the ordinances was invalid; that the planning commission
had no basis to exercise discretion; and that the special exceptions
had to be granted. The District Court of Appeal, Second District,
194. It would be a unique hardship for Stuart Marine, having purchased
property in a primarily marine area, having built a marina, and having planned
to build a boat storage later, to be told now that it cannot receive a variance for
a higher use, to build marine facilities in a marine area.
305 So. 2d at 246-47.
195. 307 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1975).
196. Id. at 494.
197. 297 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 308 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1975).
198. 297 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1974).
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agreed that the zoning ordinances contained insufficient standards,
but the court quashed the writs of mandamus. "When the vehicle
whereby the exception could be granted became invalid," said the
court, "the opportunity to obtain the exception was lost. In effect,
the appellees have successfully attacked the validity of the very
power, the exercise of which they sought to have the court com-
pel. " "' In Bal Harbour Village v. State ex rel. Giblin,29 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, agreed with petitioner-appellee
that the zoning ordinances of the village were invalid because they
had been enacted without the prior notice and public hearing re-
quired by statute. The court then affirmed the issuance of a peremp-
tory writ of mandamus to compel the village to issue a building
permit. Unfortunately, the court did not explain whether peti-
tioner's legal right to obtain a building permit flowed from the zon-
ing ordinances which had just been declared invalid, or from some
other source. Nor did the court explain the standards it had applied
in determining petitioner's legal right to the permit.
The case is further complicated by the court's refusal to give
effect to a new comprehensive zoning ordinance, enacted in full
compliance with the publication requirements while the appeal was
pending. The village alleged in a supplemental memorandum, ap-
parently without dispute, that petitioner's plans and specifications
did not comply with the new ordinance. Noting these circumstan-
ces, the court held that "the passage of a new ordinance does not
destroy the rights which may have accrued to appellee under his
application for a building permit.""'" This holding suffers from the
defect noted above, namely, the court's failure to explain the source
and nature of petitioner's "rights" to obtain a building permit when
the zoning ordinances have been declared invalid.
The same court appeared more cogent in Metropolitan Dade
County v. Rosell Construction Corp.,2" holding that an applicant
has no vested right to the issuance of a building permit where the
county has demonstrated a substantial question as to the effect of
the construction upon the public health, arising from sewage dis-
posal problems.
State ex rel. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. City of Miramar'"3
199. 297 So. 2d at 77.
200. 299 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 311 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1975).
201. Id. at 618.
202. 297 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
203. 306 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1975).
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takes a much more limited view of the role of mandamus than is
reflected in Giblin. Petitioner in Zuckerman-Vernon applied to the
city for approval of a proposed plat and for issuance of building
permits. About 3 weeks later a meeting was held to air objections.
One week later the city council voted to table the matter pending
conferences with attorneys and zoning experts. Six more weeks
passed and the council still had not reached any decision. Petitioner
then sought a writ of mandamus to compel favorable action on his
application. The trial court conducted a trial on the merits and
denied relief, partly on the grounds that portions of the city's zoning
plan were invalid.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed, but on
a different basis than was given by the trial court. The appellate
court held that mandamus was an inappropriate vehicle, since the
city's function in approving or disapproving such applications is
discretionary, not ministerial. The court added, by way of comment,
that mandamus may lie in a proper case to compel the city to
consider an application and render a decision. However, a petitioner
would first have to exhaust administrative remedies by allowing the
city a reasonable time to act on the application. The court noted
that in the circumstances of the present case, at the time suit was
filed, the city had not unreasonably delayed its decision.
Drage-Grothe, Ltd. v. Lake Jessamine Property Owners
Association2" involved the relationship between the board of county
commissioners and the planning and zoning commission. A special
act provided that any person aggrieved by a recommendation of the
planning and zoning commission could file a timely appeal with the
board of county commissioners, upon which the board would con-
duct a hearing de novo. When the board "denied" a recommenda-
tion of the planning and zoning commission which was favorable to
the appellant without any appeal pending as provided under the
act, without any evidence before it, and without prior notice to the
appellant, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that
the board had exceeded its authority.
In Marca, S.A. v. Dade County °5 the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that the circuit court should have granted a
motion to supplement the record in proceedings for review of an
204. 304 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1975).
205. 304 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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order denying rezoning, so that the movant could have the record
reflect the rezoning of comparable property a few weeks later.
State ex rel. Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc. 06 illustrates the
interface between zoning and the law of public nuisance. After zon-
ing had been changed, citizens invoked the law of public nusiance
to prevent the use of the property in the manner contemplated by
the rezoning. First, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that an activity may constitute a judically abatable nuisance,
notwithstanding its compliance with the zoning ordinance. In effect,
this permits a zoning classification to be collaterally attacked in
public nuisance proceedings. Second, the court noted that an action
to abate a nuisance may be brought by any citizen of the county,
in the name of the state, without the necessity of a prior application
to the state attorney, and without the necessity for the citizen rela-
tor to show special damages different in kind from the injury to the
public at large. Third, an action to abate a public nuisance may also
be brought by an individual, but without proceeding in the name
of the state. In this event the individual can qualify for standing to
sue only by showing special or peculiar damages, different in kind
from those of the public at large.
In Miller v. MacGill,07 the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, held that objections by an overwhelming number of neighbors
did not constitue legally sufficent reason for the issuance of an in-
junction against the construction of a convenience store. Presuma-
bly, in light of the Sailboat Key decision, an injunction would have
been proper if the objectors had been able to convince the court that
the proposed construction would constitute a public nuisance.
Intergovernmental problems arose in some zoning cases during
the survey period. In Orange County v. City of Apopka, °0 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the municipally-
owned airport located outside the city limits is subject to the zoning
laws of the county. However, if the city wishes to apply to the county
for a special exception or a zoning change, it may do so. If the county
declines, the reviewing court should balance the competing public
and private interests to reach an equitable resolution, and should
206. 295 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 453 (Fla.), cert. denied, 308
So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1974). Another similarly styled case, involving another phase of the same
litigation, is reported at 306 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
207. 297 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1975).
208. 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). See also City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299
So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (companion case).
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declare the zoning ordinance inapplicable if it appears that the
county has acted "unreasonably." The result seems to impose a
lighter burden on a city than on another applicant for relief from
the county's zoning.
Willumsen v. Horton'"9 involved attempts by two zoning au-
thorities to exercise jurisdiction over the same territory. A special
law enacted in 19491(1 vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Whitfield
Zoning District, for the zoning of certain lands in Manatee County.
A special law enacted in 196311 conferred zoning jurisdiction upon
Manatee County, expressly reserving to the Whitfield Zoning Dis-
trict the authority conferred in 1949. Despite this reservation, Man-
atee County zoned certain land in the Whitfield area as R-3. In
reliance on this classificiation, owners of some of the land entered
into option contracts with private parties, with warranties as to the
existence of R-3 zoning. Whitfield Zoning District then asserted its
authority to rezone the land. In an action for a declaratory judg-
ment, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, sustained the
authority of the District.
The landowners asserted that the District should be estopped
to rezone the property, since the District, as a "special municipal
corporation," had actual or constructive knowledge of the at-
tempted exercise of zoning power by another governmental author-
ity. Although recognizing that municipal corporations may be sub-
jected to the doctrine of estoppel, the court stated that
the doctrine does not generally operate to embarrass [the munic-
ipal corporation] in its capacity to govern by preventing it from
exercising its police powers. . . . A review of the decisional law
of Florida reveals that in instances where the doctrine of estoppel
has been invoked against a municipality in respect to exercise of
its zoning powers, the cases generally involve issuance of a permit
or performance of some other acts within municipal authority
which were later countermanded after being relied upon in good
faith and to the substantial detriment of the party seeking to
invoke the estoppel."'
The landowners in this case failed to allege a situation which could
qualify as an estoppel, "there being no allegation that appellees ever
209. 307 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 315 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1975).
210. Fla. Laws. 1949, ch. 25996.
211. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-1599.
212. 307 So. 2d at 834-35.
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sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the District, that the District
was unwilling to respond or that it is seeking to change its position
to the detriment of appellees." 1
In Parkway Towers Condominium Association v. Metropolitan
Dade County,"' the supreme court permitted the county to proceed
with construction of a public building which failed to conform to the
county's own zoning ordinances, upon noting that the county com-
mission had resolved to make a retroactive change in the zoning so
as to validate the proposed project. The court expressed the view,
prospectively, that county or municipal projects should not be con-
structed or operated in violation of zoning ordinances, and that any
necessary amendments to the ordinances should be enacted before
construction or operation is started.
E. Administrative Due Process
In Buchman v. State Board of Accountancy,15 the Board had
revoked the license of a certified public accountant, upon finding
that he had committed the following acts: (1) certifying false and
fraudulent financial statements; (2) willfully permitting false
amounts to be included in the statements; and (3) certifying the
statements although he knew or should have known that his audit
had not been performed in accordance with generally accepted au-
diting standards. The supreme court21 ruled that the record con-
tained sufficient evidence of the falsity of the financial statements
to sustain the first finding, but insufficient evidence of specific in-
tent to sustain the other two. The court concluded that license
revocation was inappropriate, and that "a public censure would best
safeguard the interest of the public and the profession." '2 7
In discussing the Board's findings, the court stated:
We are not substituting our judgment for that of the Board, but
rather we are viewing the evidence, noting that the statute is
213. Id. at 835.
214. 295 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1974), discharging the writ of certiorari which had been issued
to review 281 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
215. 300 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1974).
216. The supreme court entertained jurisdiction on appeal from the district court of
appeal, which had rendered a per curiam decision sustaining the validity of the accountancy
statute against challenges on constitutional grounds. The supreme court affirmed this aspect
of the district court decision in a single sentence, and then proceeded to discuss other aspects
of the case, as indicated in the accompanying text.
217. 300 So. 2d at 674 (emphasis in original).
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penal in nature, and considering only that evidence tendered
meeting the fundamental requirements of due process of law.
This is not to say that the Board is required to follow all of the
technical rules of evidence but the Board is required to provide
substantive due process within the evidentiary hearing."8
Further, in explaining why two of the Board's findings had to be
reversed, the court stated that, with regard to those findings:
"[Tlhe record does not disclose substantial competent evidence
introduced in conformity with the requirements of due process of
law. 21 9
The court makes no mention of the 1961 Florida Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 2  although this statute was applicable to the
agency proceedings and to the court's review in this case. The
court's silence on the APA is understandable, since the 1961 version
of the Act did not deal with the question of substantial evidence. 2 '
Prior cases, noting that the APA provided no guidance on this point,
developed the substantial evidence rule as one of the standards
implicit in the certiorari form of review. 222 By basing the substantial
evidence rule on the requirements of due process, the Buchman
opinion suggests that the rule must be followed, even in situations
where the certiorari form of review is not used. We note that the
1974 revision of the APA,22 which became effective after Buchman,
sets forth significantly more detail than did its predecessor on many
matters, including substantial evidence and the scope of judicial
review. 24 Future cases arising under the 1974 APA can therefore be
decided on the basis of the sustantial evidence rule contained in
that statute. Insofar as administrative law cases arise in situations
218. Id. at 673.
219. Id. at 674.
220. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1973).
221. FLA. STAT. § 120.27 (1973) dealt with the admissibility of evidence in administrative
proceedings, and § 120.31(2) dealt with the scope of judicial review, but neither provision
dealt with the substantial evidence rule. See sources cited in note 222 infra.
222. Peden v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 189 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966), stated that since the 1961 APA did not deal with sufficiency of evidence, the court
would follow the substantial evidence rule announced in the leading pre-1961 case of De Groot
v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957). See also Schreiber Express, Inc. v. Yarborough, 257
So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1971); Authors' Comment on Florida Appellate Rule 4.1, 32 FLA. STAT. ANN.
at 237-39 (1967).
223. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (Supp. 1974).
224. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1) (Supp. 1974) deals with admissibility of evidence in adminis-
trative proceedings, and § 120.68(10) deals specifically with the substantial evidence rule
within the context of judicial review of agency action.
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not covered by the APA, 25 Buchman provides a due process basis
in addition to the certiorari basis for applying the substantial evi-
dence rule.
The Buchman opinion does not set forth the specific provisions
of the accountancy statutes and rules relied upon by the Board. As
read by the present authors, the statute22 and rules 27 authorize the
Board to revoke a CPA's license on various grounds, including any
one of the three grounds reflected in the Board's findings in this
case. Following this interpretation, it is submitted that the court,
by sustaining at least one of the Board's findings, necessarily sus-
tained the Board's legal authority to revoke the license. The lack of
evidence to sustain the other two findings could be regarded as
harmless error. The court does not explain why it reduced the sanc-
tion from revocation to public censure. Even though the statutes do
not appear to require this result, the court could conceivably justify
the reduction of the sanction by reliance upon article I, section 17
of the constitution, which prohibits "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or
unusual punishment . . ." At any rate, an explanation of the
court's rationale would be highly desirable.
By failing to explain its rationale, the court leaves the impres-
sion that it may have followed a tendency noted in the previous
survey, 8 of empathizing with the member of a regulated profession
accused of misconduct or incompetency, rather than with the regu-
latory agency attempting to enforce professional standards.
The supreme court had another occasion to discuss administra-
tive due process in Hollywood Jaycees v. State Department of
Revenue.22 A statute3 " authorized the Florida Department of Reve-
nue ("DOR") to invalidate tax exemptions which had been granted
by county boards of tax adjustment. The statute did not provide for
a hearing by the Department, but another statute"' did provide an
opportunity for trial de novo in the circuit court at the instance of
225. The 1974 APA applies generally to all state agencies, with narrowly drawn excep-
tions, but only to limited categories of local government agencies. See generally Levinson,
supra note 25, at 624-26.
226. FLA. STAT. § 473.251 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT. § 473.20 (1967).
227. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 21A-13 (1975).
228. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 615-16, commenting on Gentry v. Dep't of Profes-
sional & Occupational Regulations, 293 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
229. 306 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1974).
230. FLA. STAT. § 193.122(1) (1973).
231. FLA. STAT. § 194.171 (1973).
[Vol. 30:277
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
a taxpayer dissatisfied by the Department's decision. The 1961 APA
expressly excluded the Department of Revenue from its provisions
regarding adjudicatory proceedings.23
The supreme court held, as a matter of due process, that a
taxpayer must be given an opportunity for a hearing before the
Department, even though the statutes include no provision to this
effect. The court observed that the judicial trial de novo provided
by statute
does not supply the initial lack of due process by the DOR. The
taxpayer is constitutionally entitled originally to administrative
due process by the DOR and should not be relegated to his own
initiative to bring a collateral judicial proceeding. Moreover, even
though Appellants are afforded a de novo judicial hearing, they
have "one strike against them" by the DOR and whether legally
recognized or not must proceed in the judicial forum burdened
with the tacit presumption that the decision of the DOR is cor-
rect. m
The court also pointed out that if the DOR makes an adverse
decision, after notice and opportunity to be heard, it should serve
the taxpayer with findings. Finally, the court noted that its decision
was limited to situations where the DOR invalidates a tax exemp-
tion granted by a board of tax adjustment. However, the opinion
contains implications for administrative agencies in general, to the
effect that due process requires an opportunity for an administrative
hearing before the agency reaches an adverse decision, and that a
subsequent judicial trial de novo is not an acceptable substitute for
the administrative hearing.
We note that the 1974 revision of the APA terminates the pre-
vious exemption of the Department of Revenue, so that the Depart-
ment is now fully subject to the Act.2 34 Further, the Act itself guar-
antees the opportunity for a "proceeding" to a party whose substan-
tial interests are affected by agency action.25 If a disputed issue of
material fact is involved, the proceeding must be a formal hearing,
including oral testimony and argument. Otherwise, the proceeding
may be informal. The Act does not expressly require oral testimony
or argument in the informal proceeding, but one of the present
232. FLA. STAT. § 120.21(1) (1973).
233. 306 So. 2d at 112.
234. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(b) (Supp. 1974).
235. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (Supp. 1974).
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authors has suggested elsewhere23 that due process may necessitate
oral proceedings in at least some situations which fall within the
informal provisions of the Act. Hollywood Jaycees lends some sup-
port to this view.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, took a restrained
view of the judicial role in reviewing administrative sanctions, in
Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Career
Services Commission, Department of Administration.237 The court
held that it should not consider the severity of the Commission's
punishment order unless the penalty was patently unfair or a depar-
ture from the statute or rules. The court held also that the privilege
against self-incrimination protects an employee from being called as
a witness against himself at a hearing before the Commission.
In Lake Shore Mortuary, Ltd. v. State Board of Funeral Direc-
tors & Embalmers,"'8 the same court sustained the Board's order
suspending a license for 90 days. However, the court set aside the
portion of the Board's order which retained jurisdiction, where the
record of discussion by board members at the meeting indicated
that their intent was to impose automatic revocation for any subse-
quent violation during the 90-day suspension period. The court ob-
served that the threat of automatic revocation violated the guaran-
tee of due process to licensees, as expressed in the 1961 APA.239
The same court considered an action by a police lieutenant
seeking promotion to captain, in Bowlin v. County of Dade.240 Under
the county's personnel rules, the so-called "Rule of Four" permitted
the department head to promote any of the four candidates ranked
highest by competitive examination. The court sustained the valid-
ity of this rule against challenges on various grounds. The court held
that a police officer,
as an employee, has no constitutional right to promotion by his
superiors. . . . [A] Director of Public Safety charged with the
enforcement of the criminal laws must be given some right of
selection as to the persons upon whom he is to impose highly
responsible positions.24'
236. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 664.
237. 299 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
238. 305 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 321 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1975).
239. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.21(5), (6) (1973).
240. 296 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1974).
241. Id. at 604.
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In Trader Tom's Florida Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Wynne, 4 ' the
state beverage director denied a liquor license to an establishment,
for the sole reason that topless dancing was permitted there. Admit-
tedly the director took no steps to revoke the licenses of other topless
dancing establishments. The District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, disclaimed any opinion as to whether the director could, by
rule, prohibit topless dancing in licensed establishments. However,
the court held that unless and until such a rule was adopted and
uniformly applied, the director could not discriminate against one
topless dancing establishment while permitting others to operate.
In State ex rel. Greenberg v. Florida State Board of Dentistry,43
the Board issued a subpoena to a journalist, commanding her to
appear before the Board under penalty of being held in contempt
of court. The document did not recite any proceeding pending be-
fore the Board, nor the nature of the matters to be discussed. Upon
being called by the journalist's attorney, the Board's attorney ad-
vised that no proceeding was pending, and that the subpoena had
been issued in order to compel the journalist to "give an account to
the respondent of a certain newspaper article which had been writ-
ten by the relator and published in the Fort Lauderdale News,
which article the respondent felt to be libelous of it."'44
The District Court of Appeal, First District, awarded a perma-
nent writ of prohibition against the Board. The essential holding is
that the court has jurisdiction to grant such relief, and that the relief
is appropriate in this situation since the Board is attempting to
exercise its statutory subpoena power for purposes other than those
expressed or implied by the statutes. This sound conclusion is ac-
companied by dictum about the subpoena power of administrative
agencies, a question which the court did not need to reach in view
of its ruling that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority.
The court observes emphatically that, regardless of the language of
the statute,
a citizen may not be held in contempt, and thereupon punished,
upon failing or refusing to obey any subpoena, process or order
of respondent or any other administrative agency until after he
or she shall have first been afforded an opportunity for a hearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction and until after that court
242. 302 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
243. 297 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. dismissed, 300 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 1974).
244. Id. at 629-30.
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shall have ordered obedience to such subpoena, process or order
of such administrative agency, and such court order shall have
been disobeyed.24 '
The court does not cite any authority for this proposition. Some
guidance is found in article I, section 18 of the constitution, which
states: "No administrative agency shall impose a sentence of im-
prisonment, nor shall it impose any other penalty except as pro-
vided by law." This provision implies, contrary to the court's dic-
tum, that a statute could constitutionally authorize an administra-
tive agency to impose a penalty other than imprisonment, and that
a statute could also properly authorize a court to impose imprison-
ment as a sanction against a person who violated a valid order of
an administrative agency. We note that the 1974 revision of the APA
provides that a person who commits contempt of an agency which
has issued a subpoena shall be subject to a $500 fine, or to any other
penalty authorized by law.246
F. Clarity and Other Due Process Requirements
The requirement of statutory clarity, as an ingredient of due
process, has been developed primarily in criminal law cases. Some
examples will be briefly noted, since the requirement has been ap-
plied, by analogy, in noncriminal situations. 47
State v. Dinsmore248 invalidated a statutory provision"" which
required public officials to file financial disclosure statements re-
garding their interests in any business "which is subject to the regu-
lation of, or which has substantial business commitments from any
state agency, county, city, or other political subdivision of the state
.... " The court found this language void for vagueness. In
Washington v. State,5 " the court sustained the validity of a
statute251 prohibiting "carnal knowledge" of a "person," as applied
245. Id. at 632 (emphasis in original).
246. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(3) (Supp. 1974). In addition, any person who violates the provi-
sions of the Act regarding ex parte communications is subject to being "assessed a civil
penalty not to exceed $500 or by such other disciplinary action as his superiors may deter-
mine." FLA. STAT. § 120.66(3) (Supp. 1974).
247. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 618-19.
248. 308 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1975).
249. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(2) (1973).
250. 302 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918 (1975).
251. FLA. STAT. § 794.01(2) (1973).
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to a man accused of homosexual rape. In State v. Egan,25 the
supreme court upheld a prosecution for the common law offense of
"nonfeasance," upon finding that the clarity requirement was satis-
fied by the statute2' which adopts the common law crimes of Eng-
land as they were in effect on July 4, 1776. However, in Holland v.
State,2"4 the district court of appeal declined to enforce the common
law crime of misprison of felony. The court conceded that this was
a common law crime, but held that the statute adopting common
law crimes should be read so as to
grant our courts the discretion necessary to prevent blind adher-
ence to those portions of the common law which are not suited
to our present conditions, our public policy, our traditions or our
sense of right and justice.25 '
The district court followed the example of other jurisdictions which
had declined to enforce the common law crime of misprison of fe-
lony. However, the court did not cite Egan, nor did it discuss the
vagueness injected into the criminal justice system by a judicial
attitude of selective incorporation of the English common law of
crimes.
During the survey period, courts relied upon the due process
clause in various situations besides those discussed above. In
Strauser v. Strauser,"6 the circuit court ordered a husband to make
future periodic payments for child support and alimony, and or-
dered the sheriff to commit the husband to jail for 15 days if any
payment was not made when due. The district court of appeal re-
versed, holding that contempt can be imposed only by a court, for
willful failure to comply with a court order, and that due process
requires the opportunity for a judicial hearing after the allegedly
contemptuous conduct had taken place. In Bussey v. Legislative
Auditing Committee of the Legislature,2 57 the court held as a matter
of due process that service of process upon the defendant's attorney
is not sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's person.
Metropolitan Dade County v. Stein"' arose out of the dismissal of
252. 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
253. FLA. STAT. § 775.01 (1973).
254. 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), noted in 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 222 (1975).
255. Id. at 808.
256. 303 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
257. 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), appeal dismissed, 312 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1975).
258. 296 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1975). In this
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a county employee. Upon being notified of his dismissal, the em-
ployee requested and was given a hearing before a hearing examiner.
The examiner recommended that the employee's dismissal be sus-
tained. However, the examiner failed to make written findings of
fact. Relying on this procedural defect in the administrative pro-
ceedings, the employee petitioned the circuit court for review by
certiorari. At the request of the county itself, the court remanded
the cause to the county manager, on the ground that the hearing
examiner had not forwarded his findings to the county manager as
required by the personnel rules. The findings were never made, and
the hearing examiner died, some 18 months after the employee had
been dismissed. After a hearing, the circuit court ordered reinstate-
ment of the employee, holding that it had become impossible to
provide the due process to which the employee was entitled. The
district court of appeal affirmed, noting that the circuit court had
discretion, either to remand for a hearing de novo before a new
hearing officer, or to order reinstatement, upon finding that the
employee had been deprived of due process in the original adminis-
trative proceedings. Judge Carroll dissented, on the grounds that
the employee was not entitled to reinstatement at this stage, but
only to a de novo administrative hearing before a new hearing exam-
iner.
G. Parole and Probation-Procedural Requirements
In Dees v. State,59 the supreme court read certain "implicit"
standards into the statutory procedures for parole revocation,"" and
ruled that the statute, as so interpreted, satisfied the procedural
requirements laid down by the United States Supreme Court in
Morrissey v. Brewer."6 ' The Florida court discussed three implicit
elements of the statute. First, the statutory requirement of a parole
revocation hearing, at which both the parolee and the state could
introduce evidence, contained the implicit guarantee that the paro-
lee could confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses, as re-
quired by Morrissey. Second, the statutory requirement of "find-
ings" by the commission was interpreted to m'ean the "written
2-1 decision, the majority relied heavily upon Metropolitan Dade County v. Klein, 229 So.
2d 589 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
259. 295 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1974).
260. FLA. STAT. § 947.23 (1973).
261. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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statement by the factfinders" required by Morrissey. Third, the
requirement of "due notice," implicit in the statute under pre-
Morrissey interpretations by the Florida courts, was "amplified and
enlarged" in view of Morrissey, so as to include written notice to the
parolee of the alleged violations, including disclosure of the evidence
against him.
Another aspect of Morrissey was discussed in Oaks v.
Wainwright,"2 an original habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme
Court of Florida. A parolee was returned to prison, on the warrant
of the Parole and Probation Commission, and did not receive a
hearing until 5 weeks later. As a result of that hearing, his parole
was revoked, and he remained in jail. He filed a petition in the
supreme court for habeas corpus, and after the court issued the writ,
the respondent did not file a return for 101 days. The supreme court
noted that Morrissey requires a preliminary hearing as promptly as
convenient, in order to determine probable cause for parole revoca-
tion, followed by a full hearing on the revocation itself. Petitioner
had been denied the preliminary hearing, and the court found this
procedural error could not be remedied at such a late stage of the
proceedings. Denial of the preliminary hearing, together with the
"unconscionable delay" in filing a return to the writ, necessitated
petitioner's release from custody and reinstatement of parole. In
addition, petitioner claimed $300 damages from respondent, pur-
suant to the statute which provides this civil remedy for failure to
file a return to a writ of habeas corpus for 3 days after service2 3 The
court made the award, but upon rehearing held it in abeyance, with
leave to respondent to show, within a reasonable time, that the
failure to file a timely return was not the fault of respondent and
was not an act of willfulness on its part.
In King v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission,"4 petitioner
filed an original habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court of
Florida. He raised serious factual issues regarding the circumstan-
ces under which he had waived a preliminary hearing, and regarding
his alleged change of residence without permission of his parole
supervisor. The commission's revocation order contained no find-
ings of fact on these points. The court held the lack of findings was
a violation of the standards of Morrissey. Treating the petition for
262. 305 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
263. FLA. STAT. § 79.05(1) (1973).
264. 306 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1975).
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habeas corpus as a motion to vacate under rule 3.850, Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the supreme court ordered the cause re-
manded to the circuit court to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
Means v. Wainwright25 was yet another original habeas corpus
proceeding in the Supreme Court of Florida. Petitioner's parole had
been rescinded because of a disciplinary report, before the parole
agreement had been signed by the petitioner. Respondent argued
that the rescission of an unexecuted grant of parole did not have to
be accompanied by the same procedural protections required for the
revocation of an executed grant of parole. The court held that rescis-
sion of an unexecuted grant of parole inflicted a "grievous loss"
which entitled petitioner to the procedural protections of Morrissey,
except that he would not be entitled to the preliminary hearing
which would be required if parole were revoked. The court ordered
petitioner released on parole, unless he was afforded a parole rescis-
sion hearing conforming to the requirement of Morrissey within 30
days.
In State ex rel. Murphy v. Partin," the supreme court rendered
a brief per curiam opinion, sustaining the validity of the statute267
which provides for immediate temporary revocation of parole if the
parolee is arrested on a felony charge. The effect of the statute is to
deprive the parolee of the opportunity for release on bail with regard
to his new felony arrest, because he is confined under the parole
revocation pending the 10-day statutory period for the revocation
hearing.
The district court of appeal in White v. State"' held that hear-
say testimony is not properly admissible in a probation revocation
hearing, and that a revocation order must be reversed if based solely
upon hearsay.
H. Eminent Domain
1. PUBLIC PURPOSE
Central & Southern Florida Flood Control District v. Wye River
Farms, Inc."' held that a jury should not be impanelled in an emi-
265. 299 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1116 (1975).
266. 301 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974).
267. FLA. STAT. § 949.10 (1973).
268. 301 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
269. 297 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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nent domain case until the court has first resolved that the taking
satisfies the public purpose requirement, since the jury's sole func-
tion is to determine the amount of compensation. The court also
held that the condemning authority does not have to submit com-
plete plans and specifications of the project in order to support the
public purpose for the taking, but that if such plans and specifica-
tions are offered, they should be admitted in evidence, and they can
be considered not only with regard to the public purpose, but also
as an indication of the amount of compensation to which the con-
demnee is entitled.
Griffin v. City of Jacksonville,270 following Ball v. City of
Tallahassee,7' held that the comdemning authority has the burden
of presenting sufficient evidence of the necessity of taking, before
any burden shifts to the condemnee. If the condemnor offers no
evidence, the petition for condemnation must fail. The resolutions
of the condemning authority reciting its findings for need of the land
do not constitute proof of necessity.
In Cusmano v. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway
Authority,27 the court sustained the validity of the "quick taking"
statutory provisions." 3 Reaffirming the tests laid down in State
Road Department v. Forehand,"4 the Cusmano court found due
process satisfied by a showing of:
"Notice to the parties, the appointment of appraisers, the sub-
mission of testimony, the right to be represented by counsel and
a determination by the court of whether or not these things have
been done . . . before possession of the land is turned over to the
petitioner.''275
When the "quick taking" provisions are invoked, which party
has the right to open and close the evidence and argument in the
circuit court? Jones v. City of Tallahassee"' considered two conflict-
ing precedents of different district courts of appeal, each supported
by respectable authority from other jurisdictions. Parker v.
270. 299 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1974), reviewed after
remand, 314 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
271. 281 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1973).
272. 301 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
273. FLA. STAT. ch. 74 (1973).
274. 56 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1952).
275. 301 So. 2d at 118, quoting State Road Dep't v. Forehand, 56 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla.
1952).
276. 304 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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Armstrong277 had held that the condemning authority had the right
to open and close, since that party would be the loser if no evidence
were presented, in that the suit would be dismissed and the property
returned to the condemnees if no evidence were presented, even
though a "quick" order of taking had been issued. Rice v. City of
Fort Lauderdale"'5 reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that
since the condemning authority secures title and right of possession
under the "quick" taking procedure by depositing the estimated
compensation into the court, the burden shifts to the condemnee to
show that the estimate does not represent full compensation; be-
cause of the shifting of the burden of proof, the condemnee should
have the right to open and close. The Jones court felt that the better
reasoned view was to permit the condemning authority to open and
close. The court decided to this effect, and simultaneously certified
the case to the supreme court as one of great public interest.
Subsequent to the Jones decision, however, an appeal in the
Rice case was decided by the supreme court, styled City of Fort
Lauderdale v. Casino Realty, Inc. 7' The supreme court agreed with
the result which the district court reached on question of who should
open and close the trial, but not with the reasoning of the district
court. The supreme court held, instead, that the predominant na-
ture of the compensation to be decided at trial was determinative
of who should open and close the trial. In doing so, the court broke
down the compensation which a landowner could receive into five
possible items of damage. 80 The court also indicated which party
had the burden of proving each item of damage.18 ' Having done so,
the court ruled that the right to open and close the trial lies with
the party who has the burden of proving the items of damage which
represent the "substantial issue for determination""2 2 at the trial,
with any doubt in cases where there are multiple substantial dam-
age issues to be resolved in favor of the landowner. Thus, although
the supreme court has resolved the conflict which existed among the
277. 125 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
278. 281 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), modified sub nom. City of Fort Lauderdale v.
Casino Realty, Inc., 313 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1975).
279. 313 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1975).
280. The items of damage are: (1) value of the land taken; (2) damage to the land
remaining or severance damages; (3) special enhancement to remaining land by improve-
ment; (4) moving expenses; and (5) business loss.
281. The landowner has the burden of proving items (2), (4) and (5), while the condemn-
ing authority has the burden as to items (1) and (3).
282. 313 So. 2d at 653.
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district courts of appeal, it remains to be seen whether the new rule
will provide adequate guidance for the lower courts.
2. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
Fleissner v. Division of Administration, State, Department of
Transportation"' held that the jury award was improper, where the
award for taking was below the range of expert testimony, even
though the award for severance was within the range, and the com-
bined amount for taking and severance was within the combined
range of expert testimony. Further, the court held that the trial
judge had erred in excluding the testimony of an experienced motel
operator, who was tendered by the condemnee as a witness on the
question of whether the motel could successfully operate after the
taking of a strip of land from the front of the property for road-
widening purposes. This question was distinct from the question of
value, and therefore the witness should have been allowed to testify,
even though he was not an expert appraiser.
In Musleh v. Division of Administration, Department of
Transportation"4 the court held that the trial judge should have
admitted a survey which had been prepared by an experienced sur-
veyor, who had been subject to rigorous cross-examination by the
condemnor, even though the survey described the property slightly
differently than it was described in the complaint.
In Ocala Manufacturing, Ice & Packing Co. v. Canal
Authority,"5 the court found that the Canal Authority had aban-
doned state condemnation proceedings and had prevailed upon fed-
eral authorities to acquire the property in federal condemnation
proceedings, in which the owner would not be able to recover costs
or attorney's fees. The court awarded damages against the author-
ity, in an amount equal to "the amount the appellant [condemneel
lost by reason of the appellee's action in prevailing on another
agency, through Federal Court action, to do that which would result
in a damage or loss to the landowner . ... " The amount in this
case was $433,561, representing $400,000 in attorney's fees and
$33,561 in costs.
283. 298 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). See also State, Dep't of Transp. v. Shaw, 30:3
So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
284. 299 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
285. 301 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
286. Id. at 498.
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I. Taxation
1. TAXATION DISTINGUISHED FROM ASSESSMENT
A sanitary sewer assessment was found invalid by the district
court in 7800 Building, Inc. v. City of South Miami."' A validly
enacted ordinance provided that assessments were to be made on
the basis of front footage. A resolution, purporting to supersede the
ordinance, required assessment by means of a formula based on
applicable zoning and optimal land use. Since the city's charter
permitted assessment procedures to be enacted only by means of an
ordinance, the resolution was held invalid.
The court went on, however, to indicate that such an assess-
ment formula would be invalid even if contained in an ordinance.
Since some of the zoning classifications allowed several types of use
which required different water and sewer need, the result of using
such a formula would be inequitable assessments. Since no constitu-
tional provision deals expressly with assessments, as distinguished
from taxes, special assessments may be authorized by the legisla-
ture on the basis of its inherent power, unrestricted by limitations
imposed on its taxing power. Nonetheless, the court found the as-
sessment formula to be arbitrary, disproportionate and unconstitu-
tional, stating that land owners would be protected by the court
whenever an assessment "so transcends the limits of equality and
reason that its exaction would cease to be a tax or contribution and
becomes extortion and confiscation ....
2. INCOME AND INHERITANCE TAXES
Taking into account the history and purpose of the new corpo-
rate income tax, the Public Service Commission had determined
that its rules should insure that a regulated industry and its inves-
tors would not completely escape the tax at the expense of its cus-
tomers. The rule which was formulated provided that in rate pro-
ceedings the Commission would treat "as an operating expense so
much of the [income tax], as is necessary to prevent the allowable
earnings of a regulated company from falling below the minimum
fair, just and reasonable rate of return allowed by the Commission
from time to time." '89 The supreme court in Gulf Power Co. v.
287. 305 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
288. Id. at 861.
289. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-14.02(b) (1973).
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Bevis'!'0 sustained the rule, subject to the elimination of the word
"minimum," and with the admonition that the rule must not be
applied in ways that would cripple a utility's capabilities to provide
adequate services or curtail its ability to attract investors. However,
the precedential value of this decision may be weakened by the
controversial circumstances surrounding it, and the resulting disci-
plining of Justices Dekle and Boyd, as well as the attorney for Gulf
Power Company. 9 '
3. IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS
a. Leasehold Interests in County-Owned Land
The constitution provides that when capital projects for airport
or port facilities or for industrial or manufacturing plants are pub-
licly financed by revenue bonds, a private leasehold interest in the
project is subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately
owned property. 2 The district court in Hertz Corp. v. Walden2 '3
found that this provision is not a self-executing imposition of taxa-
tion. Rather, it merely puts these properties on a parity with other
facilities which may be owned by a government body and leased to
private parties, but which were built without revenue bond financ-
ing.
Having decided that issue, the court then considered whether
two leasehold interests which Hertz had in county-owned land were
immune from taxation. The Florida Constitution does not mention
immunity from taxation. However, property owned by the state or
a county has been held by case law to be immune from taxation,
regardless of the use to which it is put. 94 Case law has also devel-
oped the rule that the legislature may confer tax exemption upon
leasehold interests of parties who lease land from the state or a
county if such interests are found to serve a public purpose. 2'5 A
statute9" has been enacted to provide such an exemption from ad
valorem taxes. Statutory law" 7 also provides that all leasehold inter-
290. 296 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974).
291. For a discussion of the disciplinary proceedings, see section II,B,3 s opra.
292. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c).
293. 299 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), aff'd, 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975).
294. See, e.g., Orlando Util. Comm. v. Milligan, 229 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert.
denied, 237 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1970).
295. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 634-38.
296. FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (1973).
297. FLA. STAT. § 196.001(2) (1973).
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ests in property of any political subdivision or authority of the state
are taxable unless expressly exempt. Thus, the question for determi-
nation in Hertz was whether a public purpose was served by the two
facilities at Tampa International Airport leased by the Hillsborough
County Aviation Authority to Hertz for use in its car rental busi-
ness.
The facilities involved in Hertz were an Authority-owned build-
ing leased by Hertz, which was adjacent to the airport terminal and
which had been financed with bond revenues, and a storage build-
ing, which was approximately one mile from the terminal and which
had been built by Hertz on airport land leased from the Authority.
In an earlier case, Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v.
Walden,29 the supreme court had denied an exemption to a car
rental company facility at the old Tampa Airport, characterizing its
purpose as predominantly private. Nevertheless, the district court
held Hertz' terminal facility to be exempt from taxation. The facts
of Hertz were distinguished from those of Walden on two points: the
car rental facilities under consideration at the new airport were
entirely different from those at the old airport and the testimony,
present in Hertz, but not in Walden, established the indispensa-
bility of readily available car rental facilities at a modern airport.
In contrast, the remote storage facilities were held taxable. These
facilities did not just furnish support to the terminal facilities, but
also included interests totally unrelated to the airport car rental.
Nothing was found to indicate that the terminal support function
could not have been furnished on property beyond the airport
boundaries. The court concluded that the use of the remote facility
was predominantly private in nature.
In Dade County v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales,99 the dis-
trict court held that during the life of the lease, the lessee holds an
estate which is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to absolute
ownership. The burden is on the lessee to prove that a leasehold
interest in government property qualifies for exemption under the
statutes. This must be accomplished by filing the requisite applica-
tion with the county tax assessor; failure to file constitutes a waiver
of the exemption privilege for that year.
Where property had been obtained by a county from the state
subject to the restriction that it be used for a public purpose, and
298. 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968).
299. 298 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1974).
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where the property had been exempted by the board of equalization
or the circuit court in the prior three years, the district court of
appeal, in Dade County v. Marine Exhibition Corp.,'"" held that an
affidavit of the acting Dade County tax assessor, asserting that
the predominant use of a leasehold interest in the land was for a
private, profit-making venture, was insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether or not the property was used for
a public purpose.
b. Property Used for Exempt Purposes
Article VII, section 3(a) allows portions of property used pre-
dominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charita-
ble purposes to be exempted by general law from taxation. In
Walden v. University of Tampa, Inc.,")' interpreting the statute :10
implementing this article, the home of the president of a private
university was held to be exempt from ad valorem taxation.
A portion of the statute' 3 dealing with homes for the aged was
excised by the supreme court in Presbyterian Homes of the Synod
of Florida v. Wood 4 for being too narrow in scope to conform to the
true intent of the constitutional limitation. The portion found un-
constitutional provided an exemption for homes for the aged only if
their residency was limited to persons under a certain income level.
The court pointed out that Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc. ,'" decided
that the 1885 constitution, had approved criteria for exemption of
homes for the aged which did not include an income test. Under the
less restrictive exemption provision of the 1968 constitution," 6 the
court found the narrower income test to be improper. The court
noted that age itself is a status on which classification for special
tax exemption treatment may be based, and that homes for the aged
are the modern charitable and religious response to the problems of
the aged, of which indigency is only one.
300. 296 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974).
301. 304 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 315 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1975).
302. FLA. STAT. § 196.191(3) (1969).
303. FLA. STAT. § 196.197 (1973).
304. 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974).
305. 208 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1968).
306. While the 1885 constitution prohibited exemption from taxation unless property
was held and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes, the 1968 constitution
(article VII, section 3) only requires that the property be used predominantly for those pur-
poses to be eligible for an exemption.
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The reliance of the Presbyterian Homes court on the Jasper
case is questionable. In Jasper the court had indicated that there
existed great legislative discretion in defining "charitable use"
stemming from the non-self-executing nature of the exemption pro-
vision of the constitution. The Jasper opinion also acknowledged
that absent an explicit statute, the judiciary itself had defined
"charitable use" in the more limited sense of "relief for the indigent
or helpless. '""'7 Despite this, the court relied in large part on Jasper
to deprive the legislature of its discretion to enact a narrower defini-
tion than that prescribed by the statute approved in Jasper.
Subsequent to Presbyterian Homes, the legislature reenacted '8
the essential provisions of the income test found unconstitutional in
that decision. The Attorney General has issued an opinion "' that
the unconstitutionality of the income test has not been cured by the
new statute; while homes for the aged must meet the remaining
requirements of chapter 196 to qualify for exemption from ad valo-
rem taxation, the income test need not be met.
4. ASSESSMENTS AND RATES
. a. Assessment
The constitution directs with limited exceptions, that regula-
tions shall be established by general law to secure a just valuation
of all property for taxation.:"" The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, in Cassady v. McKenney:1 ' was of the opinion that the
criteria established by law are intended to limit the otherwise con-
siderable discretion of the tax assessor in determining the fair mar-
ket value, which has been equated with the just value of realty. The
court concluded, therefore, that an assessor is obligated to consider
all of the statutory criteria, and that failure to consider two of the
seven criteria in Florida's Green Belt law ' mandated reassessment.
In order to create a case for equitable relief from an assessment,
307. 208 So. 2d at 825.
308. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-264, creating FLA. STAT. § 196.197 (Supp. 1974).
3:09. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-275 (Sept. 6, 1974).
:310. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
:311. 296 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
:312. FLA. SWAT. § 193.461(6) (1971). One of the criteria ignored was the present depre-
ciated value of the improvements on the land. The court found that orange trees were "im-
provements" and that "present depreciated value" meant the actual current value, not the
original or replacement cost.
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the supreme court in Dean v. Palm Beach Mall, Inc." ' held that the
allegations in the complaint and the proof adduced at trial must
negate every reasonable hypothesis in support of a legal assessment.
This is so because of the presumption of correctness which favors
the taxing authority.
The district court in Firstamerica Development Corp. v.
County of Volusial" acknowledged that an agricultural use does not
necessarily have to be efficient or economical to qualify the land for
an agricultural classification, but held that where the agricultural
use was not the primary use, but rather was clearly incidental, the
land did not qualify. Since the land in question had been acquired
for the primary purpose of subdividing and marketing it as lots in a
land installment sales promotion, it was found not to be in the
agricultural category despite its use for agriculture during the year
of the assessment.
In Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Synder,"5 another case
dealing with subdivision of land, the supreme court again consid-
ered the constitutional requirement of just valuation. It found that
this requirement was violated by a statutory provisiont "' for valua-
tion of unsold, platted land on the same basis as unplatted acreage
of similar character until 60 percent of the platted land had been
sold as individual lots. The addition in the 1968 constitution of four
classes of exceptions to the just valuation requirement '" was found
by the four-member majority to clearly imply removal of the author-
ity to legislate others. Although the two dissenting justices pointed
out that uniformity is required only of the rate of taxation,"' not of
the regulations for just valuation, the majority held that no separate
standards for valuation could be established for any classes of prop-
erty other than those specified in the constitution. Even if the stat-
ute had applied to all property, the court stated that it could not
have survived. The classification based on ownership was said to be
unreasonable, arbitrary and not related to a valid legislative pur-
pose.
313. 297 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1974).
314. 298 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1975).
315. 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1974).
316. FLA. STAT. § 195.062 (1973).
317: Exception is made in the case of agricultural land, land used for noncommercial
recreational purposes, tangible personal property held for sale as stock in trade, and livestock.
FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4(a), (b).
318. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
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b. Distinction between Void and Voidable Assessments
If an assessment is void, a plaintiff seeking relief from it is
excused from having to exhaust administrative remedies by appear-
ing before the Board of Tax Adjustment and from having to file suit
within 60 days as required by Florida Statutes Section 194.171(2)
(Supp. 1974). However, a plaintiff complaining of a voidable assess-
ment must do both. A void tax assessment is one not authorized by
law, where the property is not subject to the tax assessed or where
the tax roll is illegal due to some affirmative wrongdoing by the
taxing official. A voidable assessment is one which, though made in
good faith and not illegal per se, is irregular or unfair."9 An assess-
ment on property exempted from taxation by the educational prop-
erty exemption statute:21 was held to be void by the District Court
of Appeal, Second District.2 ' However, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, has held that an assessment for taxation of a lease-
hold interest in government property is merely voidable because of
the statutory authority to tax such interests absent a showing by the
lessee that its use qualified the interests for exemption.2 2
J. Borrowing
The Jacksonville Port Authority proposed to issue revenue
bonds to finance the construction of two projects, to be occupied by
private businesses. One was a food distribution center for the Publix
chain of super markets; the other was a laundry which would service
industrial working garments for industrial customers, not for the
general public. The Authority relied upon article VII, section 10(c),
one of the new provisions appearing in the 1968 revision of the
constitution, which permits statutes to authorize "revenue bonds to
finance or refinance the cost of capital projects for industrial or
manufacturing plants . . . ." This provision was implemented by
a statute enacted in 1969, :31- which repeated the terms "industrial
or manufacturing plants" with little further clarification.
319. Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung, 262 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1972).
320. FLA. STAT. § 196.198 (1973).
321. Walden v. University of Tampa, Inc., 304 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert.
denied, 315 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1975).
322. Dade County v. Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A., 298 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist.),
cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1974).
323. FLA. STAT. §§ 159.25-.43 (1973).
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In State v. Jacksonville Port Authority:24 the supreme court
sustained both projects. The court found no difficulty in approving
the food distribution center, in view of earlier decisions which had
approved a beverage bottling plant 2 ' and a meat processing facil-
ity:2 under the same constitutional and statutory provisions. The
court granted approval to the laundry facility "somewhat less read-
ily, for it will be involved primarily in the rendering of services as
opposed to the processing or distribution of products." '27 Noting
that the laundry would not serve the general public, but instead
would serve industries, the court declared:
While the clientele and the nature of the cleaning services are not
alone determinative of whether the proposed project qualifies as
an "industrial plant," these are certainly proper factors for con-
sideration along with the size of the plant, the number of employ-
ees, etc. '2
The Attorney General was asked whether a district hospital
board may accept interest-bearing promissory notes from patients
in payment for hospital charges, and then endorse such notes to
local financial institutions with recourse as to principal. In his opin-
ion, ' the Attorney General noted that the practice did not seem to
be merely incidental to the paramount public purpose of the hospi-
tal district. The importance of the benefit to private parties led to
the opinion that the practice would probably violate article VII,
section 10, which prohibits the state or its subdivisions from using
their taxing power or credit for the benefit of private parties.
As indicated in the introduction to this survey,330 article VII,
section 10 was amended in 1974, to permit local governments to
participate with private parties in the financing of electrical gener-
ating or transmission facilities.
K. Spending and Using Public Resources
In Dickinson v. Bradley,33 ' the state comptroller resisted pay-
324. 305 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1974).
325. State v. Jacksonville Port Authority, 266 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
326. State v. County of Dade, 250 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1971).
327. 305 So. 2d at 169.
328. Id.
329. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-250 (Aug. 9, 1974).
330. See section I supra.
331. 298 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1974).
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ment of a claim bill to a Dade County constable on several
grounds. 32 One of the grounds was that the legislature, by requiring
payment of the bill to be made by the state "out of general county
funds," had directed that payment be made from the funds which
are derived from parimutuel wagering and which are distributed to
the counties under constitutional and statutory requirements. Al-
though the court noted the "inartful draftsmanship or language"33
used by the legislature in its requirement of payment "from general
county funds," the court declined to imply that this meant payment
from parimutuel funds, since such funds are already "very minutely
committed for distribution to the several individual counties," '334
and the court would not alter this sytem of distribution without a
clear expression of legislative intent. The court held, instead, that
the general tax revenues of the state can be appropriated by the
legislature for any proper purpose, and "[tlo that extent the gen-
eral revenue funds of the state are available as general county funds
subject to appropriation." '335
In Markham v. State Department of Revenue,"3 ' the unsuccess-
ful candidate in the election for Tax Assessor for Broward County
challenged the canvass and count of the votes. The successful candi-
date defended against this challenge, and incurred attorney's fees.
He used personal funds to pay the attorney's fees which were in-
curred before he took office, but sought a judicial declaration that
he could use the funds budgeted for his office to pay the attorney's
fees incurred after he took office. The district court of appeal held
that the public interest was not sufficiently involved to justify the
expenditure of public funds for such purpose, since the dispute was
between the two candidates as individuals, and did not involve the
official duties of the Tax Assessor.
In Sattler v. Askew337 the supreme court was presented with a
class action by residents of Broward County, alleging that provi-
sions of several statutes33 constituted an unconstitutional system
for the statewide distribution of primary road funds, and that the
system was being applied in an unconstitutional manner, resulting
332. Other aspects of the case are discussed in the text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
333. 298 So. 2d at 354.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. 298 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 309 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1975).
337. 295 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1974).
338. FLA. STAT. §§ 206.41(4)(a), 335.04, 339.08 (1973).
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in discrimination against residents of Broward County. Specifically,
the complaint alleged that, although Broward County was the 2nd
largest in the state on the basis of population and gasoline consump-
tion, it ranked 66th out of 67 counties in miles of state highway per
registered vehicle, 61st in miles of state road per square mile of area,
66th in miles of state road per person, and 57th in per capita con-
struction expenditure. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss,
holding that the alleged facts, even if proven correct, did not state
a cause of action, since no person has a constitutional or statutory
right to a proportional expenditure of the state's highway funds. The
supreme court affirmed, with the additional observation that "[a]
greater per capita expenditure of road funds in Florida's northern
counties, for example, directly benefits the residents of the southern
counties, not only because these roads are equally available to the
southern county residents for their use, but also because they are
necessary to encourage the tourist industry so vital to South Flor-
ida." '9 The court clarified that this was merely an example of the
manner in which the expenditure of state highway funds equally
benefits all state residents, and that no county or its residents has
any right to have any particular proportion of the funds expended
within the borders of the county.
The Attorney General rendered a number of opinions on the
expenditure and use of public resources. One opinion34 indicates
that municipal funds may be used to support or oppose the question
of annexation of territory to a municipality, since this is a matter
that affects and involves the interests of the municipality and its
citizens. The funds may be disbursed through a non-profit citizens'
committee, subject to appropriate audit and review by the city
clerk.
Another opinion"' states that a municipality may not expend
public funds to purchase land for the purpose of leasing or selling
the land to a private industry. Nor may a municipality purchase
land so as to lease or sell even a portion of it to a private industry,
unless such lease or sale is incidental to a valid public purpose for
which the purchase was primarily made.
Finally, the Attorney General opined342 that voting machines
339. 295 So. 2d at 291.
340. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-227 (Aug. 5, 1974).
341. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 074-249 (Aug. 9, 1974).
342. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 075-71 (Mar. 12, 1975).
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owned by a county may not be loaned to a private nonprofit corpora-
tion or to a school in connection with classroom projects, unless
some public purpose will be served by such use. The opinion implies
that the loan was unauthorized by statute, and that no compensa-
tion was offered to the county for the use of the machines. These
circumstances distinguish the opinion from City of West Palm
Beach v. Williams," '4 in which the supreme court held that "where
bonds are not issued, public funds are not spent, and the power of
eminent domain is not exercised in furtherance thereof, a munici-
pality can lease public land for private uses in accordance with
legislative authority." '344 The question left open in Williams remains
open-whether the public purpose test would be violated by a rental
at less than fair market value.345
L. Claims Against State and Local Governments and Officers
Holmes v. School Board of Orange County34 applied the tradi-
tional rule that a county school board enjoys sovereign immunity,
unless immunity has been waived by general law. In this case, im-
munity had been partially waived by the statute347 which permits
suits and recoveries arising out of vehicular accidents only up to the
limit of liability insurance coverage. The court held that no greater
amount could be recovered from the school board. The court noted
also that the driver of the school bus did not enjoy immunity from
personal suit by the plaintiff.
In Baugher v. Alachua County,34 after an inmate of Alachua
County Jail had been murdered by a fellow prisoner, the parents of
the decedent brought suit against the county and against the sheriff,
alleging negligence and wrongful death. The court was called upon
to decide which of the defendants was responsible for the operation
of the jail. Finding no Florida statute or case law on point, the court
relied upon American Jurisprudence for the "controlling principle"
that the sheriff is deemed to have the powers "usually regarded as
belonging to the office, including that of the custody of the common
jail and of the prisoners therein . . . ..." The court observed that
343. 291 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1974).
344. Id. at 578.
345. See 1974 Survey, supra note 1, at 652-53.
346. 301 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1975).
347. FLA. STAT. § 234.03(4) (1973).
348. 305 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
349. 60 AM. JuR. 2d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 9 (1972).
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while the county owns the jail and provides funds for its operation,
the sheriff is responsible for daily operations, including the alloca-
tion of specific prisoners to specific cells. Accordingly, suit against
the county was dismissed. The court noted that this result was
reached, even though the county had purchased liability insurance
and had thereby waived immunity to the extent of the insurance
coverage. "The waiver of immunity," said the court, "does not es-
tablish liability in absence of a showing that the governmental
agency has committed a tort." ''5 Since the county was not responsi-
ble for daily operation of the jail, it had not committed a tort.
Hernandez v. City of Miami35" ' arose from the death of a motor-
cyclist in a collision at an intersection where telephone company
repairmen were working. The administratrix of the decedent's es-
tate brought suit against the city, alleging that the city was negli-
gent in failing to station a police officer to direct traffic at the
intersection, where telephone company vehicles were parked in such
a manner as to obstruct the view and create hazards to traffic. The
court held that the claim against the city must be dismissed, since
the deployment of police officers is a matter within the discretion
of the city, involving a duty owed to the public at large and not to
the decedent or any other individual. The court followed Wong v.
City of Miami ' and City of Tampa v. Davis,53 both of which held
that a municipality is immune from liability for breach of a duty
owed to the public at large.
In Boca Raton v. Coughlin,354 plaintiff sued the city for false
arrest and false imprisonment. She alleged that at 3:00 A.M., city
police officers woke her by knocking on the door of the private home
where she was employed as a sleep-in babysitter. Upon answering
she was met by the officers who announced they were there to exe-
cute a search warrant. They found some pornographic material in a
bedroom closet. Plaintiff was then arrested without a warrant, and
charged with possession of obscene material, in violation of a munic-
ipal ordinance. She was taken to the police station, and later
released on bond. The evidence was eventually suppressed, the
charges dismissed, and plaintiff brought this suit. The jury awarded
350. 305 So. 2d at 839.
351. 305 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
352. 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970).
353. 226 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
354. 299 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
her $50,000.00. On appeal, the city argued that improper charges
had been given to the jury.
The district court of appeal held that the ultimate issue for the
jury was whether or not the police officers reasonably believed in
good faith that their arrest of plaintiff was constitutional. The trial
court should have given the charge requested by the city, that at the
time of the arrest, an ordinance of the city made it an offense for
any person to possess obscene material, and that its constitution-
ality had not yet been specifically determined. However, the court
should also have charged that 2 years before the arrest, the United
States Supreme Court had invalidated similar provisions in other
jurisdictions, and had held that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material
a crime. :' Using these charges, the jury would be in a position to
properly determine the reasonableness and good faith of the officers
in making the arrest.
M. Education
In Cornwell v. University of Florida ' the university notified a
nontenured professor that he would not be recommended for tenure,
and that his employment would be terminated at the end of a notice
period. The district court of appeal, upon the professor's petition for
certiorari, denied relief.
The termination of employment was decided by an administra-
tive officer of the university, without giving Professor Cornwell an
opportunity for a prior hearing. The officer's decision was supported
by a vote against tenure at a meeting of the tenured faculty mem-
bers of a certain department, but Cornwell contended this was not
the proper department to vote on the question, and instead he re-
quested a vote by an "area committee" consisting of faculty mem-
bers from the various subject-matter areas which his professional
activities overlapped. His request for a vote by an area committee
was denied. Later, he received a hearing before the university's
Academic Freedom and Tenure Committee. At this hearing, the
officer who had terminated Cornwell's employment stated his rea-
sons for doing so, and these reasons included statements tending to
reflect upon Cornwell's reputation. The committee reached certain
355. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
356. 307 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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conclusions and made certain recommendations, which the court
did not describe, but the court did state that the president of the
university correctly determined that he was not bound by these
conclusions or recommendations.3 57
Cornwell claimed, as a matter of due process, the right to a
hearing before denial of tenure, since at that time he asserted he had
an expectancy that tenure would be granted, unless proper cause
were shown for denial. In this context, his "expectancy" of tenure
obviously means his belief that he was legally entitled to it. 5' How-
ever, the court used the word "expectancy" in quite another sense,
referring to his anticipation about the likelihood that in fact tenure
would be granted. Over a page of the opinion is devoted to discus-
sion of evidence tending to prove that Cornwell had ample reason
to fear that in fact tenure would not be granted. 5 The court con-
cluded that he had no "expectancy," because he had reason to fear
denial. The court did not evaluate his claim to an "expectancy"
based on legal entitlement to tenure.
Having been denied a pre-termination hearing, Cornwell pur-
sued the post-termination hearing before the Academic Freedom
and Tenure Committee, at which the adverse statements about his
reputation were made. These statements, if unjustified, could have
indicated that the decision to deny tenure had itself been unjusti-
fied. Cornwell, therefore, had a significant interest in arguing, to the
court, that the statements were unjustified. In response to Corn-
well's assertions, first, that he had been improperly denied a pre-
termination hearing, and second, that unjustified criticisms of his
reputation had been made at the post-termination hearing before
the committee, the court stated: "Petitioner first complains of no
hearing and then of too much hearing. The latter was at his request.
He may not have his cake and eat it too."3 "
Another important issue in the case is whether the university's
criteria for tenure are unconstitutionally vague. The court stated,
357. Id. at 211.
358. In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court declared: "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation
of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577. The Cornwell
opinion cites Roth, but proceeds to apply a test based on the "unilateral expectation" rather
than on the "legitimate claim of entitlement."
359. 307 So. 2d at 206-07.
360. Id. at 210.
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on this point: "No useful purpose will be served by quoting the
provisions of [the university's tenure] manual here. Suffice it to
say that our reading of the criteria reveals them to be neither vague
nor overbroad. . . . We find the questioned criteria to be in keeping
with constitutional requirements as to vagueness and over-
breadth."""
This survey would be unduly prolonged by detailed analysis of
the numerous other points discussed by the court. In summary, the
opinion fails to provide satisfactory judicial reasoning of the crucial
issues involved, and fails to demonstrate that justice was done in
this case.
N. Homestead Exemption from Alienation
1. FAMILY RELATIONSHIP
Did Jerry qualify as the "head of a family" for homestead pur-
poses at the time of his death? Jablonski v. Caputo"2 relates that
Jerry married Martha in 1925, but they separated after a few
months. In 1934 Jerry began living with Pauline. In 1947 Jerry and
Pauline acquired real property in the name of "Jeri'y and Pauline,
jointly." They constructed a tavern on the property, together with
living quarters which they occupied. In 1951 Jerry and Pauline were
ceremonially married. Jerry died in 1954, leaving no children. He
was survived by both Martha and Pauline. The evidence was in
conflict as to whether Jerry and Martha had ever been divorced
from each other. :",
Without dispute, Pauline was entitled to the one-half interest
in the property attributable to her joint ownership dating from the
time of acquisition. The dispute was between Pauline and Jerry's
sister, as administratrix of his estate, regarding the other half inter-
est, which had been Jerry's until his death.
If Jerry and Martha had been divorced before Jerry's marriage
to Pauline, the latter marriage would be valid. As a result, at the
time of his death Jerry would be the head of a family, consisting of
Pauline and himself, and this family would have lived together on
the property. Since all other requirements for homestead would be
361. Id. at 210-11.
:362. 297 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
363. The case was remanded to the trial court to hear further evidence on the issue of
the validity of the divorce.
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satisfied, Jerry's half interest in the property would be homesteaded
and Pauline would take it, as surviving spouse.
On the other hand, if Jerry and Martha had not been divorced
before Jerry's marriage to Pauline, the latter marriage would be
invalid. In that event, Jerry's family would consist of Martha and
himself. However, that family would not have lived together on the
property. Thus, the property would not be able to qualify as home-
stead, and Jerry's half interest would descend under the laws of
intestate succession which, as it happened, would result in the prop-
erty passing to Martha. A complete analysis of the law requires
mention of still another possibility. If Jerry continued to be under
a legal obligation to support Martha, he could still have been re-
garded as head of a family for homestead purposes, even though
Martha did not live with him on the property. The court did not
explore this possiblity, apparently because the separation between
Jerry and Martha terminated his obligation of support.
Estate of Deem v. Shinn3" illustrates the very point omitted
from the above opinion. The marriage between Mr. and Mrs. Deem
produced two daughters. The Deems separated and became di-
vorced. Mrs. Deem and the daughters lived in Massachusetts and
Mr. Deem in Florida. After the divorce, Mr. Deem purchased prop-
erty in Florida and lived there. Neither Mrs. Deem nor the daugh-
ters ever lived in the Florida property. The court found that Mr.
Deem never supported the daughters, and that he "affirmatively
refused and evaded his support obligation to his family." ' 5 His will
expressly disinherited his daughters. At the time of his death, one
of the daughters was a minor.
The court recited the rule that, for homestead purposes, the
"head of a family" must either live on the property with other
family members under circumstances indicating that he is in
charge, or be under a legal duty to support other family members. 6
The court found that Mr. Deem was under a legal duty to support
his minor daughter, and that the Florida property where he resided
thus became homestead, even though no other family member lived
there with him. Since the property was homestead and since the
decedent was survived by a minor child, it was not subject to devise,
but instead passed to his lineal descendants.
364. 297 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
365. Id. at 612.
366. The court cited Brown v. Hutch, 156 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963), and In re Estate
of Wilder, 240 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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2. DEVISE
The 1972 amendment to article X, section 4(c) provides that
"the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be no
minor child." In re Estate of McCartney367 construed this provision
and held that a testator without a minor child can devise the home-
stead to his surviving spouse, absolutely and in fee simple, and is
not restricted to devising a life estate to his spouse with a vested
remainder in his adult children. The supreme court derived this
result, not only from the 1972 amendment, which was adopted while
this litigation was pending and thereby became part of the law of
the case, but also from the earlier decision in In re Estate of
McGinty."
3. CONVEYANCE TO SPOUSE
In Foerster v. Foerster,369 the husband executed a deed purport-
ing to convey homestead property to his wife. This was expressly
authorized, without the wife's joinder in the deed, by a statute7 "
enacted in 1971. However, the court found the conveyance, as well
as the underlying statute, invalid by reason of article X, section 4(c)
which provides, in part: "The owner of homestead real estate, joined
by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage,
sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an
estate by the entirety with the spouse." The court observed: "Why
the legislature enacted a law which is so patently unconstitutional
is difficult to understand."37' However, the court did not discuss the
possibility that a conveyance from husband to wife may not be
"alienation" as contemplated by the above constitutional language,
nor the policy reasons for insisting that the wife join in a conveyance
to herself.
4. OTHER ASPECTS OF HOMESTEAD3 72
Ryskind v. Robinson373 reaffirms prior case law that the home-
367. 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974).
368. 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971).
369. 300 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
370. FLA. STAT. § 689.11(1) (1973).
371. 300 So. 2d at 35.
372. See also Reid v. Bradshaw, 302 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), and Shedd v. Luke,
299 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1975), each dealing with
a combination of homestead and real property law.
373. 302 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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stead exemption cannot be used as a shield against a fraudulent
transaction, and that under such circumstances an equitable lien
might arise which may be enforced against homestead property.
0. Coverture and Property
Until a statutory amendment in 1973, 371 widowers could not
elect to take dower, although widows could. Decedent died in 1972,
and the supreme court held that it must apply the dower statute as
it existed at the date of decedent's death, without regard to subse-
quent amendments. Decedent's second wife was the surviving
widow, and his first wife was a judgment creditor. The second wife
elected to take dower. The first wife filed objections to this election,
and asserted that the dower statute was unconstitutional in that it
discriminated against males by allowing women, but not men, to
elect dower. By a vote of four to three, the supreme court held, in
In re Estate of Humphreys,"' that the first wife lacked standing to
assert this argument, since she was obviously not a member of the
class victimized by the alleged discrimination. The court expressly
declined to rule upon the constitutional question.
The present authors note that the statute as it then existed
seems clearly authorized by article X, section 5 of the Florida Con-
stitution, which provides that "dower or curtesy may be established
and regulated by law," a phrase introduced as an "exception" to the
general requirement of equal treatment of married men and married
women with regard to the holding, disposition, etc., of property.
Thus, the constitutional issue raised by a statute providing dower
for women but not for men seems to be exclusively a federal consti-
tutional issue. The United States Supreme Court decision in Kahn
v. Shevin37 lends some support to such a system, as a type of com-
pensatory discrimination.
When a wife's separate funds are used to acquire property in
which title is taken as tenants by the entirety, is the husband pre-
sumed to hold her equity in trust for her, or is he instead presumed
to have received a gift? Before adoption of the 1968 revision of the
constitution, cases recognized the presumption of a trust in favor of
the wife, although in the converse situation, a payment from the
374. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34-.36, 733.09-14 (1973). Dower and curtesy have since been
abolished. See FLA. STAT. § 732.111 (Supp. 1974).
375. 299 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 968 (1975).
376. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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husband's funds for the acquisition of property taken as tenants by
the entireties was presumed to be a gift to the wife.
The judicial attitude has changed, in view of the new provi-
sion" ' in the 1968 constitution requiring equal treatment of married
women and married men. Ball v. Ball37 holds, on this basis, that
whether the funds are provided by the husband or the wife, a gift
to the other spouse is presumed.
377. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
378. 303 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), following Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So. 2d
825 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
